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BETrER BITCH THAN MOUSE:
RUTH BADER GINSBURG, FEMINISM, AND VMI

CAREY OLNEY*

INTRODUCTION

Throughout her career as a litigator and a jurist, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg has understood that the Constitution has routinely denied
protection to large classes of Americans. She has also understood
the capacity of the Constitution to expand, through time and
interpretation, and include those once excluded in its guarantees.
During the 1970s, Ginsburg's arguments figured prominently into
the Supreme Court's slowly developing formula granting gender
discrimination cases heightened scrutiny under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Through her spoken voice
before the justices of the Supreme Court and with her written voice
in numerous briefs, she was a central figure in the major gender
discrimination cases of the decade.'
The author is a Ph.D. student in Political Science at the University
of
Minnesota. She earned he; B.A. from Centenary College of Louisiana in May
2000. An earlier version of this paper was awarded first place in the annual
competition for best honors thesis held by the Political Science undergraduate
honor's organization Pi Sigma Alpha. The author would like to thank Dr. Rodney
Grunes for his guidance and support.
Ginsburg argued and collaborated in briefs for the American Civil Liberties
Union's Women's Rights Project in: Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (held unconstitutional the military's practice of requiring a female
member to prove that she paid more than half of her husband's expenses to
receive increased benefits while a serviceman did not have to prove his wife's
dependency); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (sustained a Florida law that
granted a property tax exemption to widows but not to widowers); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (overturned a provision of the federal Social
Security Act that awarded survivor's benefits to widows but not to widowers);
Edwards v Healy, 421 U.S. 772 (1975); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977) (held in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment
the section of the Social Security Act in which a widow received benefits
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regardless of dependency on her spouse, but a widower had to prove that he had
received at least half of his support from his spouse); Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357 (1979) (held that Missouri's exemption of women from jury duty
service on request violated the defendant's rights guaranteed by the Sixth and
Fourteenth amendments). Ginsburg collaborated in briefs for the petitioners:
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (struck down a law that preferred males to
females for selecting administrators of estates); Struck v. Sec'y of Def., cert.
granted, 409 U.S. 947, judgment vacated, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972); Turner v. Dep't
of Employment Sec. of Utah, 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (held that a statute denying
unemployment benefits to pregnant women twelve weeks before her expected
due date until six weeks after delivery violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment). Ginsburg assisted in amicus briefs in: Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (held
that a Pittsburgh ordinance as construed to forbid newspapers to carry sexdesignated advertising columns for nonexempt job opportunities does not violate
petitioner's First Amendment right to freedom of speech); Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1973); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417
U.S. 188 (1974) (held that petitioner violated the Equal Pay Act of 1963 by
paying a higher base wage to male night shift inspectors than to female
inspectors performing the same tasks during the day); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976) (held that petitioner's failure to cover pregnancy related disabilities
in its disability benefits plan does not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (held that cases involving sex-based
classifications were subject to intermediate scrutiny: a statute which classifies on
the basis of sex "must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to those objectives"); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (in a case involving a man who was sentenced to death for rape, the Court
held that the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishments
prohibited punishments that are grossly disproportionate to the crime); Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (held that Title VII prohibited the application
of Alabama's statutory height and weight requirement to work as a state prison
guard); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (held that petitioner's
policy of denying employees returning from pregnancy leave their accumulate
seniority violates Title VII); Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (held that a university may consider racial criteria as a single aspect of a
competitive admissions process as long as fixed quotas were not used); City of
Los Angeles, Dep't of Power & Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (held
that petitioner's policy requiring female employees to make larger contributions
to its pension fund than male employees violated Title VII); Off v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268 (1979) (applying the intermediate scrutiny test from Craig v. Boren, the
Court found that Alabama's law allowing alimony orders only against males was
not substantially related to the state's proffered goals); Califano v. Westcott,
443 U.S. 76 (1979) (held that Section 407 of the Social Security Act providing
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As a litigator, Ginsburg sought to prod the Supreme Court
to adopt a heightened standard of review when deciding gender
discrimination cases. To this end, she pursued cases she deemed to
be "clear winners," that is, cases challenging laws the Supreme
Court could not possibly uphold.2 In addition, she believed that
each case was a stepping stone, moving the Court closer and closer
3
to adopting strict scrutiny in gender discrimination cases.
In this article, I analyze two aspects of judicial decisionmaking: judicial background characteristics and lower court
impact. First, I look at the background factors that have heightened
Ginsburg's sensitivity to discrimination, discuss the various
categories of feminist jurisprudence and place her within that
framework, and discuss her judicial philosophy. Ginsburg's
benefits to families whose dependent children have been deprived of parental
support because of the unemployment of their father, but not because of the
unemployment of their mother, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (found
that the gender-based distinction in Missouri's workers' compensation law
governing death benefits for widows and widowers violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
2 Deborah Markowitz, In Pursuitof Equality: One Woman's Work to Change the
Law, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 73, 75 (1989). Markowitz cites Ginsburg's oral
history, recorded February 24, 1986 in Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Pursuitof
Equality].
3 Id.; Until the 1970s, the Court recognized only two levels of scrutiny
when
evaluating the constitutionality of discriminatory programs: strict scrutiny
(requiring that a discriminatory law be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest) for cases involving race and national origin, and rational
scrutiny (requiring only a rational relationship between the law and the
governmental interest) for everything else. Thus, before the 1971 cases Reed v.
Reed, gender discrimination cases were routinely reviewed using the lower form
of scrutiny. The Supreme Court did not articulate a level of heightened scrutiny
specific to gender discrimination until Craig v. Boren in 1976.
4 Scholars have recognized for decades that background factors, including
race,
religion, and gender, influence the behavior of justices. BARBARA A. PERRY, A
"REPRESENTATIVE"

SUPREME COURT?: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RELIGION, AND

GENDER ON THE APPOINTMENTS 20 (1991). Studies by scholars who favor

background analysis include: S. Sidney Ulmer, Social Background as an
Indicator to the Votes of Supreme Court Justices in Criminal Cases 1947-56
Terms, 17 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 622 (1973); C. Neal Tate, PersonalAttribute
Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in
Civil Liberties and Economics Decision, 1946-1978, AM. POL. Sci. REV. 355
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(1981); Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55
AM. POL. SC. REV. 844 (1961); Sheldon Goldman, Backgrounds, Attitudes and
the Voting Behavior of Judges, 31 J. OF POL. 214 (1969). Opponents of the
method doubt whether certain values can be explained by background
characteristics, noting that background is not distinguished from individual
experiences and that this method of explanation ignores the impact of the
interaction of the other justices on their votes. For example see, Joel B.
Grossman, Social Backgrounds and JudicialDecisions: Notes for a Theory, 29
J. OF POL. 334 (1967) and Further Thoughts on Consensus and Conversion, 31
J. OFPOL 223 (1969).
The author believes, however, that gender will be the prevailing
variable in this case. Studies on Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the first woman
on the Supreme Court, indicate that gender does impact the justice's decisions, at
least in cases of overt gender discrimination. While O'Connor is by no means an
uncompromising champion of women's rights, in gender discrimination cases,
she often votes against the conservative block with which would otherwise align.
Barbara Palmer, Note, Feminist or Foe? Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Title
VII Sex Discrimination,and Supportfor Women's Rights, 13 WOMEN'S RTs. L.
REP. 159, 170 (1991). However, scholars have found that even though she
recognizes some manifestations of gender discrimination and seeks to eliminate
them, she is not necessarily as sensitive to subtle forms of negative stereotypes.
Nadine Taub, Sandra Day O'Connorand Women's Rights, 13 WOMEN's RTS. L.
REP. 113, 116(1991).
In this paper, background is assessed by looking at how Ginsburg's
experience as a woman and as a Jew sensitized her to discrimination, as well as
how her prior legal experience as a litigator and a judge shaped her conception
of how issues of discrimination should be dealt with in the legal realm.
Ginsburg's feminist jurisprudence is determined by discussing the characteristics
of the three primary categories of feminist jurisprudence and then examining her
articles and speeches to determine which category best characterizes her
orientation. Finally, I consider Ginsburg's judicial role orientation. This refers
to a jurist's concept of the proper behavior for someone in her institutional
position. Scholars generally recognize two role orientations to explain the
voting behavior of jurists: judicial restraint and judicial activism. The idea of
restraint rests on the assumption that a jurist seeks to curtail her involvement in
policy making. The premises underlying the doctrine ofjudicial restraint include
the judicial limitations outlined in the 1936 case Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936): (1) the Court will not determine the constitutionality
of legislation in nonadversary proceedings; (2) it will not anticipate questions of
constitutional law; (3) it will not formulate a rule broader than necessary; (4) it
will pass on ruling on constitutionality if there is another ground for deciding the
case; (5) the party protesting must show direct injury; (6) it will not invalidate a
statute if the party has already taken advantage of its benefits; and (7) it will
always interpret the statute in a constitutional manner if at all possible. In
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dedication to combating discrimination did not occur in a vacuum.
Rather, it developed as a result of a perceived inequality on the
basis of gender, which she became aware of over time. This
perception of inequality laid the foundation for her personal
framework for feminism. However, not only has Ginsburg written
extensively on gender discrimination and the law, but she has also
been quite outspoken in the area of judicial behavior - she praises
judicial restraint. Thus, I consider these factors as I explore the
gender discrimination jurisprudence and judicial role orientation of
Justice Ginsburg considering her decision in VMI as the capstone
case illustrating this behavior. Finally, I examine whether Justice
Ginsburg's opinion is consistent with her goal as a litigator of
trying to shift the Supreme Court's standard of scrutiny for genderbased classifications closer to strict scrutiny and explore how that
VMI influenced the outcome of gender discrimination cases in
lower federal courts from July 1996 to May 2001. 5
contrast, judicial activists theoretically shed the constraints limiting judicial
action, molding the law to fit her policy preferences and asserting the courts as
policymakers. STEVEN HALPERN & CHARLES LAMB, SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM
AND RESTRAINT 37-50 (1982).

The Supreme Court depends on lower courts to implement, through
interpretation, the decisions that it hands down. Often, the initial interpretation
of Supreme Court decisions is made by state courts and lower federal courts what Bradley Canon and Charles Johnson refer to as the interpreting
populations. BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL PoLCIEs:
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 29 (1999). Lower courts often enjoy a sense of
discretion in deciding their cases because these decisions often are not appealed
and are usually final. Higher courts rely on the clarity of decisions, effective
communication of decisions, and continued support by lower court judges of
their decisions. Id. at 29-5 1.
I examine the impact of VMI on lower federal courts only. While the
interpretation of decisions in both state and federal courts is significant, the
limitations of this project require me to focus on only one. To determine impact,
the number of published cases in which federal district and circuit court judges
adopt Ginsburg's terminology and refer to her opinion as precedent are
examined. Only published opinions are considered.
Fifteen United States District Court opinions cited United States v.
Virginia in this period: Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480
(N.D. CA 1996); Eng'g Contractors Assoc. v. Metro. Dade County, 943 F. Supp.
1546 (S.D. FL 1996); Zoch v. City of Chicago, 94 C. 4788 (N.D. IL 1997);
Barnett v. Texas Wrestling Assoc., 16 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Breyer v.
5
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There is inevitably a tension between judicial restraint and
feminism, yet Ginsburg has considered both in the course of her
career. In Reed v. Reed and subsequent cases she asked the
Supreme Court to ignore its own precedent and reconstruct the
Constitution to include the rights of women. How does she balance
these two competing philosophies? Does she, as a jurist, maintain
the activism she valued as a litigator challenging codified gender
stereotypes? 6 Does this tension result in inconsistent imprecise
decisions in gender discrimination cases?
Meissner, 23 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D. Penn. 1998); In re Sherbrooke Sodding, 17
F. Supp. 2d 1026 (Minn. 1998); N. Shore Concrete & Assoc. v. City of New
York, 94 Cv. 4017 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Thorpe v. Virginia State Univ., 6 F. Supp.
2d 507 (E.D. Va. 1998); Jefferson v. City of Harvey, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20158 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Richmond Med. Ctr. v. Gilmore, 55 F. Supp. 441 (E.D.
Va. 1999); Sheriffs Silver Star Assoc. of Oswego County, Inc. v. County of
Oswego, 56 F. Supp. 2d 263 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); Ashann-Ra v. Virginia, 112 F.
Supp. 2d 559 (W.D. Va. 2000); Assoc. Util. Contrs. of Md., Inc. v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 83 F. Supp. 613 (D. Md. 2000); Assoc. for Fairness in Bus., Inc. v.
New Jersey, 82 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D. N.J. 2000); Deblasio v. Johnson, 128
F.Supp. 2d 315 (E.D. Va. 2000)

Fourteen United States Court of Appeals cases cited United States v.
Virginia: Cohen v. Brown Univ., 92 F.3d 446 (1st Cir. 1996); Keevan v. Smith,
100 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 1996); Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467 (D.C. Cir.
1996); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1996); Women Prisoners of
the D.C. v. D.C., 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Coalition for Econ. Equity v.
Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997); Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281 (8th
Cir. 1997); Eng'g Contractors Assoc. of S. Florida. v. Metro. Dade County, 125
F.3d 702 (11th Cir. 1997); Klinger v. Dep't of Corrections, 107 F.3d 609 (8th
Cir. 1997); Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997); Franks
v. Kentucky School, 142 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 1998); Buzzetti v. City of New
York, 140 F.3d 134 (2nd Cir. 1998); Terrell v. INS, 157 F.3d 806 (10th Cir.
1998); Hill v. Ross, 183 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. AhumadaAguilar, 189 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1999); Tuan Ahn Nguyen v. INS, 208 F. 3d
528 (5th Cir. 2000).
6 1 use the expression "better bitch than mouse" to illustrate this tension. It
originates from an incident related in THE NEW REPUBLIC:
A few days after the president nominated here to the Supreme
Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg received a fax from a member of
the Rotary Club in Bernardsville, New Jersey. On June 18, the
writer reported, one of Judge Ginsburg's law school
classmates had presided over a Rotarian induction ceremony;
and during his formal remarks after dinner, the classmate
recalled that he had known Ginsburg "by her law school
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Section I presents a biography of Ginsburg, including her
famous 1970s case sequence, and discusses the major premises of
feminist jurisprudence. Section II examines her judicial philosophy
through an examination of her writings and speeches. Section Inl
analyzes Ginsburg's decision in VMI by outlining the changes it
makes to traditional intermediate scrutiny. Section IV assesses the
impact of the VMI case on the decisions of lower federal courts,
that is, the extent to which lower courts utilize the decision.
SECTION I

Ruth Bader Ginsburg was born on March 15, 1933 in
Brooklyn, New York. Her father, Nathan Bader, immigrated from
Russia in his early teens and her maternal grandparents came to the
United States from Poland shortly before her mother's birth.7 She
credits her mother with imparting a love of learning. 8 Ginsburg's
mother died of cervical cancer in June 1950, the day before she
was to see her daughter graduate at the top of her high school
class. 9 Though she died when Ginsburg was only 17, her mother
had a profound impact on her life. In her speech accepting her
nomination to the Supreme Court, Ginsburg said that her mother
was "the bravest and strongest person [she had] known, who was
taken from [her] much too soon."' 0 She went on to say that she
regretted that her mother could not have "lived in an age when
women could aspire and achieve and daughters are cherished as
much as sons. '"1 While Ginsburg's blossoming as a feminist came
nickname 'Bitch."' Apologizing profusely, the writer assured
Ginsburg that he had asked Rotary club authorities to ban
"sexist and scatological statements" at all meetings in the
future. Ginsburg read the fax silently. She then exclaimed,
"better bitch than mouse."
Jeffery Rosen, The Book of Ruth, NEW REPUBLIC, August 2, 1993, p. 19 .
7 Malvina Halberstam, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: The FirstJewish Woman on the
United States Supreme Court, 19 CARDOzO L. REV. 1441, 1443 (1998).
8
1d.
9
Id.

1oTranscript of President's Announcement and Judge Ginsburg's Remarks, N.Y.
TIMES, Al, June 15, 1993.
11Id.
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years after her mother's death, she was already nurturing seeds of
equality at a young age.
In the fall of 1950, Ginsburg entered Cornell University. As
an undergraduate, her interest in law was stimulated by Professor
Robert Cushman. 12 Ginsburg graduated with high honors in
Government and with distinction in all subjects in 1954.13 Soon
after graduation, she married Martin Ginsburg.14 A year older than
his partner, Martin had completed his first year at Harvard law
school before their marriage. 15 Although Ruth had also been
accepted to the law school, Martin received his draft notice and the
Army relocated the young family to Fort Sill, Oklahoma. 16 The
move forced Ginsburg to receive her first bitter taste of gender
based employment discrimination. While in Oklahoma, she
accepted a position in the local Social Security office. When she
disclosed she was pregnant, her superior decided that she could not
travel to a training session required for a promotion for which she
was otherwise qualified. Consequently, Ginsburg received a lower
17
position with less pay.
When Martin's period in the Army ended in 1956, the
Ginsburgs returned to Boston. The Harvard Law School experience
provided endless humiliation and discrimination for the few
women accepted in the 1950s. As was common at many law
schools at the time, professors called on women just for "comic
relief."' 8 At a dinner given for the nine female first year students,
Dean Erwin Griswold demanded that each woman explain how she
12
13

Lynn Gilbert & Gaylen Moore, Particular Passions 156 (1981).
Halberstam, supra note 7, at 1445. Years after graduating from Cornell,

Ginsburg recalled:
It was the heyday of McCarthyism and Cushman defended our deep-seated
national values - freedom of thought, speech and press. ... The McCarthy era
was a time when courageous lawyers were using their legal training in support of
the right to think and speak freely. That a lawyer could do something that was
personally satisfying and at the same time work to preserve the values that have
made this country great was an exciting prospect for me.
14id.

15Id.
6
'1
d.
17id.

18GILBERT& MOORE, supra note 12, at 158.
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justified taking a place in the class that would otherwise have gone
to a man. 19 Not wanting to appear too assertive, Ginsburg answered
2
that she thought that studying law would make her a better wife. 0
Still, Ginsburg excelled. Even though she was married, had a small
child, and took notes in her Martin's classes as well as her own,
law review and ranking
she defied the odds by serving on the
21
class.
her
in
students
ten
top
the
among
In 1958, Martin graduated from Harvard and accepted a
position with a New York law firm and Ginsburg transferred to
Columbia for her final year.22 She graduated in 1959 as a Kent
Scholar and tied for first in her class. In spite of her outstanding
credentials, she had great difficulty securing a job. Not a single law
firm in New York offered her a position.23 Coveted clerkships also
proved elusive for the young lawyer. Legendary jurists Felix
Frankfurter and Learned Hand refused to hire Ginsburg because of
her gender. 24 Eventually she was hired by Judge Edmund L.
Palmieri of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York.25
Following her clerkship, Ginsburg did receive offers from a
number of law firms, but declined them in order to join the
19 Halberstam, supra note 7, at 1445.
20 David Margolick, Judge Ginsburg's Life a Trial by Adversity, N.Y. TIMES,
Al, A9, June 25, 1993.
21Henry Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators 319 (1999).
22 id.

23 As she explained later: "In the fifties, the traditional law firms were just
beginning to turn around on hiring Jews ....

But to be a woman, a Jew, and a

mother to boot, that combination was a bit much." Id. at 1446.
2 Id. at 1442; Margolick, supra note 20, at A9. Oddly enough, while she did not
have the opportunity to clerk for Judge Hand, Ginsburg saw the jurist daily while
she sat in the back seat of Palmieri's car as he drove Hand to and from work.
While he claimed that he did not want to hire a woman because he deemed his
language inappropriate for the sex, he felt no reason to protect Ginsburg from his
crass language in that venue because, in his words, "'Young lady, here I am not
looking you in the face."' Margolick, supra note 20, at A9.
25 However, she did not secure her clerkship for Palmieri easily either. While
the judge was impressed with her outstanding record, he only accepted her after
receiving a written promise from a male lawyer who agreed to leave his law firm
job to assume her place if her work was unsatisfactory. Halberstam, supra note
4, at 1443.
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Columbia Law School Project on International Civil Procedure.
The Carnegie Foundation project conducted research on foreign
systems of civil procedure and the U.S. rules on transnational
litigation with the aim of proposing improvements to the latter.2
Ginsburg's experience in Sweden proved to be a turning point in
her views on gender equality. While she did not enter law to
champion women's rights, as she observed an unfamiliar system in
which women were well integrated into the legal profession, where
female judges were common, and even pregnancy did not
discourage the participation of women, Ginsburg began to envision
a broader role for women in American society in general and the
legal profession in particular. 2s
In 1963, Ginsburg returned to the United States and began
teaching at Rutgers Law School in Newark, New Jersey, one of the
few law schools at the time willing to accept women on its
faculty. 29 During this time Ginsburg became involved in the legal
struggle for women's rights. Initially, she was involved with the
New Jersey affiliate of the American Civil Rights Union (ACLU)
and, as gender discrimination complaints began to increase in the
late sixties, they were referred to her because, as she has explained,
"well, sex discrimination was regarded as a women's job. 30 She
was inspired both by her students at Rutgers as well the women
referred to her by the ACLU to take an even more active role in

d.at 1446.

id.
2 Margolick, supra note 20, at A9; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Equal Rights
Amendment is the Way, I HARV. WOMEN's L. J. 19 (1978).
27

Id. at 20. Ginsburg applied for a position at Columbia Law School, but was
rejected because of her gender. While a professor at Rutgers, Ginsburg initiated
29

a number of projects that sought to highlight the treatment of women by the legal
,stem including what would become the Women's Rights Law Reporter.
GILBERT& MOORE,

supra note 12, at 153.
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challenging senseless gender lines in the law. 3 1 Her intellect and
tenacity brought her success and her success brought her
notoriety. 32 In 1970, she became nationally active in the ACLU,
co-authoring the petitioner's brief in Reed v. Reed.33 Following
Reed, she founded and became co-director of the ACLU's
Women's Rights Project (WRP).3 a In this capacity she participated
in scores of cases in the 1970s, presenting oral arguments in six,
collaborating in the briefs of three, and assisting in amicus curae
35
briefs on an additional fifteen.
The Supreme Court Dismisses Gender Discrimination Before
Reed
"'Were our state a pure democracy there would still be
excluded from our deliberations . . . women, who, to prevent

deprivation of morals and ambiguity of issues should not mix
promiscuously in the gatherings of men."' 36 Ginsburg has often
utilized this quote by Thomas Jefferson to illustrate that women
were not meant to be included in the freedoms embodied in the
31Id.;

In a recent lecture, Ginsburg recalled some of the cases that came to her
attention as council for the New Jersey ACLU in the late 1960s and early 1970s:
early in her pregnancy, Eudoxia Awadallah, a secondary school teacher was
asked to go on unpaid maternity leave with no guarantee that her job would be
waiting for her after she delivered her baby; a Lipton Tea Company employee
was denied the privilege of transferring her family to her insurance policy (which
was more generous than her husband's policy) because she was married;
Princeton University sponsored a summer math and science program for preteem boys but not girls because, the school maintained, they were a distraction to
boys. Ruth Bader Ginsgurg, Introduction to Women and the Law: Facing the
Millennium, 32 IND. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (1999) [hereinafter Facing the
Millennium].
32 Ginsburg's notoriety as a litigator seemed to overpower her gender as
a barrier
to employment. Leaving Rutgers for Columbia in 1972, she became the first
tenured woman on the Columbia Law School faculty. Halberstam, supra note 2,
at 1447.
33 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
34Id.
35 See supra, note 1.
36 Quoting Thomas Jefferson inMartin Gruberg, Women in American Politics
4
(1968).
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Declaration of Independence or the United States Constitution.
Not only were women excluded from the original understanding of
the Constitution, until 1971 the Supreme Court routinely upheld
statutes that created classifications based on gender, founding its
conclusions on two traditional concepts: women are naturally
ordained to be subordinate to men, and laws that treat women
different from men are "benign," designed to protect, not repress,
women. 38 Thus, courts endorsed institutionalized unequal
treatment of women, often expressing paternalistic concern for the
"ladies" and notions of "chivalry." 39 Limitations on the economic
opportunities for women and chivalric protections of the sex
constituted the very flesh of Supreme Court doctrine toward
women from the founding of the republic until nearly threequarters of the way through the twentieth century. 4° A woman's
identity, not to mention her financial stability, rested on her
husband, a tradition that the Court was unwilling to challenge even
37 See e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex and Unequal Protection:Men and Women

as Victims, 11 J. FAM. L. 347 (1971) [hereinafter Sex and Unequal Protection].
38 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CiN. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1975). Ginsburg notes that:
[T]wo themes dominated Anglo-American literature and case
reports. Their strains are echoed even to this day. First,
women's place in a world controlled by men is divinely
ordained; second, the law's differential treatment of the sexes
operates benignly in women's favor. Supra at 2.
39 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, From No Rights, To Half Rights, To Confusing Rights,
7 HUM. RTS., 12, 13 (1978) and Ginsburg, Sex and UnequalProtection, supra at
note 37, at 350.
40 In Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872), the Court ruled that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit a state from
barring women from the bar. Two years later, the Court held that the privileges
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not include the right of
women to vote, Minor v. Happersett, 38 U.S. 162 (1874). At the turn of the
century, in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), the Court found that a state
law limiting the hours that a laundress could work did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause, though it suggested that similar restrictions for men would. In
1948, the Court upheld a law which prohibited a woman from bartending unless
her husband or father owned the tavern to protect women from the "moral" and
social problems," Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465-466 (1948), which the
state argued could arise from female bartending.
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Liberties heyday under the Chief
during the Civil Rights/Civil
41
Warren.
Earl
of
Justiceship
Out of the Cage - Free At Last?: Ginsburg From Litigator to
Judge
When she approached the Supreme Court with gender
discrimination cases, Ginsburg believed that "the challenge of the
1970s [was] to dislodge artificial props that continue[d] to support
a sex role division made obsolete by technology and society's
drastically curtailed child-production goals." 42 As an advocate, her
strategy was to expose the sexist assumptions underpinning
statutes by revealing them as flagrant generalizations.43 As director
of the WRP, Ginsburg orchestrated much of the strategy at the
41One of the few cases involving gender discrimination decided by the justices

during this era was Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). This 1961 case
involved a Florida statute challenged on Fourteenth Amendment grounds
because it exempted women from mandatory jury service. The Supreme Court,
in a unanimous decision, found that the statute was constitutional because it was
based on a reasonable classification and that Florida had not arbitrarily
undertaken to exclude women from jury service.
42 Supra note 2, at 350.
43 Markowitz, Pursuit of Equality, supra note 2, at 79. Because of her role as an
advocate before the Supreme Court, Ginsburg is often hailed as the "Thurgood
Marshall of gender equality law." However, some scholars have questioned this
comparison. Michael Confusione argues that, while as litigators both justices
utilized the court system to achieve their ends, as justices they maintained highly
different conceptions of both equal protection and judicial role theories. Michael
James Confusione, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Thurgood
Marshall: A Misleading Comparison, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 887 (1995). He has
asserted that Ginsburg favors "procedural equality" which emphasizes classblind legislation. Id. at 887-895. While Marshall employed a "substantive
equality" approach stressing that sometimes classifications must be upheld to
redress the disadvantages that these groups face. Id. at 895-898. In addition,
Confusione finds that Ginsburg has more concern for the form of judicial ruling.
Id. at 898-901. Marshall was concerned about the impact of the decisions. Id. at
901-3.
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Supreme Court level selecting only those cases she deemed "'ripe
for change through litigation.'"4
Reed v. Reed in 1971 was the first time in the history of the
nation that the Supreme Court declared a sex based classification
unconstitutional.
Notably, it did so unanimously. The case
involved an Idaho statute that preferred males to females when
administering estates.45 Both Sally and Cecil Reed petitioned the
probate court to administer their son's small estate. However, in
accordance with the statute, the court automatically awarded
custody to Cecil. While the Idaho statute was repealed before the
case was heard, the new code only applied prospectively, thus not
affecting the suit between the Reeds. 46 So, while the appellee
requested that the case be dismissed for lack of a substantial
federal question, the Court kept the case on its docket.47
Ginsburg's goal in the brief was to emphasize three factors
that she believed had altered the social fabric in such a way to give
women the freedom to discover a place in society beyond the
home: advances in technology that reduced the need for a full-time
homemaker, advances in medicine that allowed women to control
reproduction, and longer life spans which provided women with
years free of caring for children. 48 She doubted that the Court
would take the monumental step of adopting strict scrutiny as the
standard in gender discrimination cases; rather, 49she hoped that the
case would lay the foundation for future change.
44 Ruth B. Cowan, Women's Rights Through Litigation: An Examination of the

American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project, 1971-1976, 8 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 373, 393 (1976).
45 IDAHO CODE, § 15-312 (1971) (cited in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 72-73
(1971)). The dispute concerned two Idaho citizens, Sallyand Cecil Reed, who
separated when their adopted son Richard was a child. As was the custom in
Idaho at the time, the court awarded the mother custody during the child's
"tender years," and the father assumed custody when the boy reached
adolescence. Richard spent some time in a juvenile home, and ultimately
committed suicide with his father's gun.
46 Markowitz, supra note 2, at 77.
47

id.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution,52 TUL. L. REV.451,
457-458 (1978) [hereinafter Sex Equality].
49 Years later Ginsburg said, "I never expected the Court to buy our broad
argument. That would have been a giant step for even a more liberal tribunal."
48
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The Court accepted much of Ginsburg's argument,
unanimously holding that a classification "must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike."50 The Court
also embraced Ginsburg's interpretation of the equal protection
principle stating that "by providing dissimilar treatment for men
and women who are ... similarly situated, the challenged section
violates the Equal Protection Clause."5' While Reed left open the
prospect of applying stricter review in future gender discrimination
cases, the Court was still far from taking that step.
When the WRP was founded, Ginsburg was working on
two cases involving sex discrimination in the military: Struck v.
Secretary of Defense5 2 and Frontierov. Richardson53 The first case
arose when Air Force nurse Captain Susan Struck challenged the
Air Force's automatic "discharge-for-pregnancy" rule. Under this
rule, a pregnant service member could either obtain an abortion at
government expense or be involuntarily discharged. For religious
reasons, Struck declined the abortion option, but planned to utilize
the leave that she had accumulated for the birth and then
immediately surrender the child for adoption.5 4 The Washington
state ACLU challenged the mandatory discharge-for-pregnancy
policy and obtained a court order staying the discharge. 5 The Air
Deborah Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's Work to Change the
Law, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 355, 341-342 (1992) (quoting Ginsburg's Oral
History)).
'o 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); the Court cited Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 4412 (1920), an equal protection case, albeit an old one, that Ginsburg
included in her brief. In Royster, the Court had articulated a far tougher standard
of review than which is used most often in modern rational basis test
jurisprudence. However, Ginsburg admitted that she was reluctant to cite the
case as it dated back to a period when the Court used due process to strike down
economic legislation. Markowitz, Pursuit of Equality (1989), supra note 2, at
80.
s' 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
52 460 F.2d 1372 (9
Cir. 1971), cert. granted,409 U.S. 947, vacated 409 U.S.
1071 (1972).
" 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
54 Markowitz, Pursuitof Equality, supra note 2, at 81.

55 Id.
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Force, on the recommendation of the Solicitor General, waived her
discharged rendering the case moot, and Struck returned to duty
after the birth.56
With the Struck case moot, the first case that Ginsburg
argued before the Supreme Court was Frontierov. Richardson in
1973. This case involved a challenge by a female Air Force
lieutenant to a federal statute that provided for different treatment
for married male and female servicemembers. 57 While the Supreme
Court upheld Frontiero's claim 8-1, still no majority congealed to
establishing sex as a suspect classification.
Two years later Ginsburg suffered her sole loss before the
high court 58 Kahn v. Shevin was initiated by a man who claimed
that a Florida statute allowing for a tax break for widows but not
widowers discriminated against him on the basis of his gender.
The Court upheld the statute, ruling that it had a benign effect on
women. 59 The majority reasoned that the law was "reasonably
designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial
impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which the loss imposes 6a
6° Edwards
Healy '
v.
disproportionately heavy burden.
challenged a Louisiana law virtually identical to the one upheld
over a decade earlier in Hoyt v. Florida. The challengers,
including a woman whose hair fell out because of a home
permanent kit and a slip and fall victim, all sought a jury trial
before those who would most accurately appraise damages. 2 The
6 id.
57 The law allowed a man to claim his wife as a "dependent," qualifying for

increased housing and family medical benefits, whether or not she was
dependent upon him for more than half of her support, while it required a woman
to prove that her husband was dependent on her income. 411 U.S. at 688.
58 Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Ginsburg did not select Kahn, but
inherited the case when it was already on the Court's docket. Even before the
Court rendered a decision, Ginsburg expressed doubts about whether the case
was ripe and later said "Kahn should never have come up that year." Cowan,
supra note 44, at 391.
s9416 U.S. at 352.
60 Id.at 355.
61 421 U.S. 772 (1975).
62

Markowitz, Pursuitof Equality, supra note 2, at 87.
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case was paired with Taylor v. Louisiana63 which challenged the
statute on behalf of a criminal defendant. Both cases were argued
in October of 1974, but Healy became moot shortly thereafter
when Louisiana adopted a new Constitution without the gender
exception. 64 Ultimately, Taylor did not explicitly overrule Hoyt
and it was not decided on equal protection grounds. Instead, the
65
majority rested its decision on the Sixth Amendment.
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld66 involved a man whose wife had
died in childbirth. He wanted to care for their son, but was denied
social security benefits. While the Social Security Act provided
survivor's benefits to women with children, it did not extend to
men with children, even though men and women paid the same rate
of social security taxes. Ginsburg argued that, while the statute
may appear to protect women, it had the effect of denying women
workers the protection provided to male workers. 67 Even though
the Court ruled in Ginsburg's favor, it did not hold that genderbased distinctions were inherently suspect.
Califano v. Goldfarb,68 a second social security case, was
regarded by Ginsburg as an extra case for the WRP because,
although it did not have particularly outstanding facts, she felt that
it would be heard before a sympathetic court and serve to
strengthen gender discrimination case law in her favor. 69 As in
Weinberger, she asserted that while the statute appeared on its
surface only to disadvantage men, it was actually "double edged"
because it accorded people who are identically situated different
treatment on the basis of an immutable characteristic.70
Despite these victories, it was not until the 1976 case Craig
v. Boren, that a majority on the Supreme Court enunciated an
intermediate standard of review for gender-based classifications.
63 419 U.S. 522 (1974).
64 Markowitz, Pursuitof Equality, supra note 2, at 87.
65 419 U.S. at 537 (1974).
6
67

420 U.S. 636 (1975).
Halberstam, supra note 7, at 1448.

" 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
69 Markowitz, Pursuitof Equality, supra note 2, at 87.
70 Id. at 92.
7' 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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Craig challenged an Oklahoma law that allowed women to
purchase 3.2 been (near-beer) at the age of 18, but prohibited men
from buying the beverage until they were 21. The plaintiffs in the
case were Curtis Craig, a teenage fraternity member who wanted to
purchase near-beer, and Carolyn Whitener, an entre reneur, who
wanted to sell the product to men under the age of 21.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Ginsburg
offered her assistance to local attorney Fred Gilbert. 7 3 Because of
the distance between the two attorneys, Ginsburg agreed to write
an amicus brief instead of co-authoring the main brief.74 During
their correspondence about the briefs and oral argument, Ginsburg
urged Gilbert to use "heightened scrutiny" because she felt they did
not have enough votes for strict scrutiny. 75 In the end, both the
amicus and the appellant's briefs presented a united front urging
the Court to apply some form of heightened scrutiny rather than
specifically insisting on strict scrutiny. 76 In a 7-2 decision, the
Court agreed that the Oklahoma law denied young men equal
protection because the state did not show that the law was
77
substantially related to the achievement of its asserted objective.
However, even with Ginsburg's victories, the decade did
not represent a hands down victory against gender discrimination.
In addition to Ginsburg's loss in Kahn v. Shevin, the Court made
several other notable decisions against women. In the 1974 case
Gedulig v. Aiello,78 the Court upheld required extended unpaid
72

Although the case is named for Craig, standing to sue ultimately depended on

Whitener because Craig turned 21 before the case reached the Supreme Court.
Markowitz,
Pursuitof Equality, supra note 2, at 93.
73 id.
74 i.

75 id.
76 id.

429 U.S. at 208. The Craig test specifically states that to pass constitutional
muster "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives," Id. at 204.
While Ginsburg was not surprised at the outcome in Craig, she admits that she
finds it ironic that the elevated review standard for ex classifications was
announced in "a case charging discrimination against boys Ruth Bader
Ginsgburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution: The State of the Art, 4 WOMEN'S
RTs. L. REP. 143, 145 (1978) [hereinafter State of the Art].
78 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
7
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maternity leaves. The Court also denied certiorari to a Sixth Circuit
case which held that a woman has no constitutional right to retain
her original surname. 79 Furthermore, cases like Struck and Healy,
which could have had a substantial impact on the development of
an equal protection theory in gender discrimination jurisprudence,
were rendered moot.
Ginsburg as Circuit Court Judge
Ginsburg resigned from her post as general counsel for the
WRP in 1980 when President Jimmy Carter nominated her to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. On the Court
of Appeals, she carved out a reputation as a swing vote, siding
more often with the Republican-appointed judges than her
Democratic colleagues.80 However, her voting record is most
conservative in cases involving regulatory issues. When one just
considers cases involving civil liberties and civil8 rights, Ginsburg's
record leans slightly to the left, but only slightly. '
In Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt,8 2 a 1983 case
requiring the judges to balance free speech and government
regulation, Ginsburg voted in favor of free speech, but refused to
79 Whitlow

v. Hodges, 539 F.2d 582 (6"' Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029

(1976).
go While on the appellate court, in non-unanimous cases, she often voted with
Republican appointees Kenneth Starr and Laurence H. Silberman. Joyce Ann
Baugh et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A PreliminaryAssessment, 26 TUL

L. REV. 1,4-5 (1994). A study of cases decided by the Circuit Court in 1987 also
indicated that Ginsburg voted most often with her Republican colleagues.
Kenneth Karpay, Bork or No Bork, GOP Bloc a Force on the D.C. Circuit,
LEGAL TIMES,

January 18, 1988, 10. In non-unanimous cases, she voted with
Robert Bork, a loyal conservative and failed Reagan appointee to the Supreme
Court, 85 percent of the time, and Patricia Wald, one of the staunchest liberals
on the D.C. Circuit at the time, only 38 percent of the time. Neil A. Lewis, Judge
Ginsburg'sOpinions: At Center, Yet Hard to Label, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1993,

Al, 10.

sI Baugh, supra at 80.
82

703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983). This case emerged in 1981 when protesters

erected a tent city in Lafayette Park, across from the White House, to symbolize
the plight of the homeless. At issue was whether the participants could sleep onsite.
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agree to a sweeping statement about free speech. Ginsburg
provided the swing vote for the 6-5 plurality which upheld the
protestor's demonstration as speech, but she refused to join the
opinion of the court which was a sweeping statement about free
speech 8 3 She clearly sought a middle ground between Antonin
Scalia's protection of only "spoken and written thought" and her
colleagues' broad interpretation of the free speech clause. She
concluded her opinion stating that
in reviewing regulation of the time, place, and
manner of expressive activity, I believe courts
should draw no bright line between verbal speech
and other comprehensible symbols of expression, or
between "traditional communicative8 4 activity" and
non-traditional modes of expression.
Thus, she upheld the rights of the protesters, but only on very
narrow grounds.
Cases involving religious freedom and civil rights often,
but not always, received similar narrow treatment by Judge
Ginsburg. She dissented in an appellate court decision not to
reconsider Goldman v. Sec'y of Def In the 1981 case Wright v.
Regan, Ginsburg wrote for the majority on the D.C. Circuit
maintaining that a group of black parents had a right to bring a
nationwide class action suit against the Internal Revenue Service
because it did not disallow tax-exempt status for schools that
discriminated on a racial basis. However, she joined with two
other judges in O'Donnell Const. Co. v. District of Columbia,s6 to
strike down a government program that set aside 35 percent of
construction contracts for minority companies reasoning that it was
inconsistent with recent Supreme Court precedent.
83 In a separate opinion, she said that she found "the case close and difficult,"

Id.

at 604 (Ginsburg, concurring).
8 'Id. at 608.
5 734 F.2d 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984). This case involved a Jewish serviceman, who
was also a rabbi, who wanted to wear his yarmulke while on duty.
86 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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"I'm Ruth, Not Sandra": The Second Female Justice
President Bill Clinton nominated Ginsburg to fill the
vacancy left by the retirement of Byron White in 1993. While the
President was impressed with her judicial career as well as her
efforts on behalf of the women's movement, leading women's
organizations were skeptical of her criticism of Roe v. Wade.8 7
Nevertheless, Ginsburg's nomination received bipartisan support in
the Senate. The Senate Judiciary hearings were exceptionally
uneventful. The Senators focused their questioning primarily on
her positions on abortion, women's rights, discrimination, and the
death penalty. While Ginsburg made no attempt to distance herself
from her previous positions, she refused to preview her votes when
questioned about the death penalty and sexual orientation. 8 After
only four days of hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee
unanimously approved her nomination and she was quickly
confirmed by the whole Senate, 96-3. 89
Feminist Jurisprudence
Unlike Sandra Day O'Connor, Ginsburg was well
entrenched in the scholarly debate over feminist jurisprudence
before her nomination to the Supreme Court. Furthermore, while
Ginsburg was involved in the legal struggle for women's rights in
the 1970s, few would portray O'Connor as an aggressive women's
rights advocate. 9° Thus, while it would not necessarily be necessary
7 ABRAHAM,
88

supra note 21, at 318-19.

Ginsburg reminded the Committee that they had access to volumes of her

speeches, writings, and decisions, but would "offer no forecasts, no hints"
regarding how she would vote on specific issues to which she had not
specifically spoken previously. Confirmation of Ruth Bader Ginsburg as
Supreme Court Justice. Before the Senate Judiciary Committee. July 20, 1993.

morning session. 103rd Congress. (Statement of Ruth Bader Ginsburg.)
89 ABRAHAM, supra note 21, at 319. The three conservatives that voted against
her were Jesse Helms (R-NC), Don Nickles (R-OK), and Bob Smith (R-NH).
90 In an article comparing the two female justices, Shelia Smith notes that, while
O'Connor's record on sex discrimination cases has been somewhat mixed,
Ginsburg's pioneering efforts to achieve equal protection for women under the
law would appear to make her future as a justice committed to extending the law
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to define O'Connor as a feminist, it is essential in a discussion of
Ginsburg.
The umbrella term "feminist jurisprudence" refers to a
kaleidoscope of perspectives, or, as Katherine Bartlett describes
them, "frameworks" employed to analyze the relationship between
law and gender. 91 While none of these theories are mutually
exclusive, three distinct frameworks are manifest in virtually any
92
discussion of feminist jurisprudence: egalitarian theory,
difference theory, 93 and dominance theory. 94 Even though these
perspectives are by no means exhaustive in their representation of
feminist jurisprudence, they do provide a simplified framework
which serves to manage the important overall themes of the
concept.
EgalitarianTheory
Egalitarian feminists, also referred to as liberal feminists
and equal treatment feminists, propose a system in which men and
women are treated as equals under the law. 95 This view assumes
that women are equal rather than inferior to men and, therefore, do
not need special protection under the law. 96 Laws providing special
treatment, even those for pregnant women in the workforce, are
seen as divisive, serving only to emphasize the differences between
the sexes. 97
in this area more promising. Sheila M. Smith, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Sexual Harassment Law: Will the Second Female Supreme Court Justice
Become the Court's Women's Rights Champion?, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1893
(1995).
91 Katherine T. Bartlett, Perspective in Feminist Jurisprudence in FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE, WOMEN, AND THE LAW 3 (Betty Taylor et al., eds.).
92 While the terms "liberal" and "egalitarian" are often used interchangeably in
many texts, the author finds the former to be somewhat misleading because of is
broader political connotation. Thus, "egalitarian" is exclusively adopted, as it is
far more descriptive and focused for this discussion. This theory is discussed in
detail supra notes 100-111 and accompanying text.
93 Discussed in detail supra notes 112-120 and accompanying text.
94 Discussed in detail supra notes 121-133 and accompanying text.
95
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
%
Id.
97 Id.
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Even so, the concept of "equality" within the feminist
debate has evolved over centuries. 98 Generally, modem egalitarian
feminists take the notion of equality very literally, advocating the
elimination of gender-based distinctions in the law. 99 Egalitarian
feminists typically reject laws that are designed to protect
women. I°° However, ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment
who saw the
was promoted heartily by egalitarian feminists
0'
law.'
neutral
gender
for
avenue
an
as
amendment
Ginsburg's feminist jurisprudence, as evidenced in her
scholarly works and decisions, echoes the core premises of
egalitarian feminism. In the 1970s, as the ERA snaked its way
through state legislatures, Ginsburg voiced strong support for its
ratification. 10 2 In fact, as recently as 1992 Ginsburg has written in
favor of the passage of the amendment to provide judges a firm
98

Seventeenth-century feminists argued that a woman's power to reason was

focused on equal access to
their minds. Julie Mitchell,
31 (1987). In the eighteentheducation, but, as MARY
WOLSTONECRAFT'S A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN, published in
1792, demonstrates, feminists of this period also emphasized the damaged done
to women and to society by conditioning women as inferior social beings. Id. at
35. But the nineteenth-century, the notion of equality had changed from an
abstract philosophical debate to an organized political movement. Id. at 37. In
the twentieth-century, the meaning of equality, particularly in the realm of
feminist jurisprudence, has been influenced by the evolution of the equal
protection doctrine. KATHERINE T. BARTLETt & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER
AND THE LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 122-3 (1998) [hereinafter
equal to that of a man's. Thus, their concerns
educational and social opportunities to improve
Women and Equality in FEMINISM AND EQUALITY
century, feminists continued to focus on

GENDER AND THE LAW].

99Id. at 123.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 The language of the proposed amendment read, "Equality of rights under the
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex." It was proposed in March 1972 with an original seven-year
deadline. After an unprecedented three-year extension, the proposal was
declared dead in 1982. The ERA ultimately needed the support of only three
additional states for ratification. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: AN
UNFOLDING STORY 45-46 (J.T. Keenan, ed., 2nd ed., 1988). Some credit the
failure of the proposal to Justice Powell's vote in Frontiero. Collin O'Connor
Udell, Signaling a New Direction in Gender Classification Scrutiny: United
States v. Virginia, 29 CONN L. REv. 521, n. 39 (1996).
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base for ruling on issues of gender equality. 10 3 She also says that
she learned while writing the Reed brief "how important it is to
include men in the effort to make women's rights part of the
human rights agenda"' 4 in order to achieve success. 05 Her
assimilationist method, including pursuing cases where men were
clients to achieve equal rights for10men
and women, grew out of her
6
pragmatic approach to feminism.
Difference Theory
Difference theory holds that because there are basic
biological differences between the sexes, such as pregnancy, the
law should accommodate such differences.'07 Because of these
differences, some feminists suggest that women should be given
special treatment under the law when faced with situations unique
to women.10 8 Likewise, laws protecting women who
are pregnant
19
or on maternity leave exemplify difference theory. 0
The debate between the necessity of equality for women
and the differences between women and men initiated the search
for a feminist jurisprudence.' 10 Egalitarian and difference feminists
disagree on how women could be viewed at "equal" if they must be
treated differently when it comes to pregnancy. Feminist scholars
and litigators in the 1970s concluded that the abstract standard of
equality should be based on the Aristotelian notion that likes would
be treated alike and unlikes would be treated unlike."'
103

Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 38, at 361.

04 Ginsburg,
10 5 id.

Facing the Millennium, supra note 31, at 1163.

i6
id.

Francis Schmid Holland, Feminist Jursprudence: Emerging From Plato's Cave
11 (1996) [hereinafter Feminist Jurisprudence].
108 Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence:An Essay, 95 YALE
L. J. 1373, 1394 (1986).
109 Id. at 1397.
11!For further discussion see CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW
107

82-85 (Routledge 1989); HOLLAND, supra note 107, at 13-16; see generally,
LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE:

DEBATE (Leslie Friedman Goldstein ed. 1992).
11Supra note 123, at 211.
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Difference feminists argue that egalitarian feminism has
caused women to lose many of their historical benefits such as
automatic custody.'1 2 Because man typically earn more than
women and standards used for measuring stability tend to value
financial security, under a gender neutrality standard in family law,
a man may appear to have a more stable status. 1 3 However,
egalitarian feminists counter that statutory schemes based on
gender isolate women as a class and emphasize the differences
between men and women rather than achieving equality between
the sexes." 4 Some scholars advocate, then, the need to abandon the
notion of sexual dichotomy in favor of5 a plurality of differences by
integrating male and female insights."
Thus, while one may argue that Ginsburg's feminist
philosophy might accord with difference feminism, particularly
because of her experience with pregnancy discrimination in
employment - her philosophy ultimately varies from that of
difference theorists due to her belief that even pregnancy does not
make women fundamentally different than men.
Dominance Theory
Ginsburg discerns no distinctively male or female manner
of thinking or writing; that is, women do not have a "distinctive
voice." She quotes jurist Jeanne Coyne's statement that "wise old
man and a wise old woman reach the same conclusion. ' 116 In
112

Catharine MacKinnon, Legal Perspectives on Sexual Difference in

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 213, 218 (Deborah L.

Rhode ed. 1990).
113 Id. at 278; In the words of law professor Drucilla Cornell, "equal" rights "do
not have as their sole or even their main goal creating a space for women in a
male world from which they have previously been shut out." Drucilla L.
Cornell, Gender, Sex, and Equivalent Rights, 280, 282 in FEMINISTS THEORIZE
THE POLITICAL (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott, eds., 1992).
114 ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 103 (University of
California Press 1988).
"

Id.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Forward on the Report of the Special Committee on
Gender, 84 GEO. L. J. 1651, 1654 (1996) [hereinafter Special Committee on
Gender].
116
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contrast, dominance theorists believe that the authentic voice of
women is suppressed by a patriarchal system."17 Dominance
theory, at times referred to as radical feminism, states that the
current legal system has been developed and maintained
by a male
Is
hierarchy which treats women as inferiors in society.I
Like difference theorists, dominance feminists respond to
issues of reproductive freedom by suggesting that women must be
treated differently to be treated equally." 9 However, dominance
feminists suggest that sexism is so deeply imbedded in American
institutions, particularly law, that superficial changes in the law
will not redress gender inequality. 20 They say that this is
demonstrated by the way that women are treated within literature,
emphasizing the widespread use of sexist language.' 2 1 Dominance
feminists believe that the social "norm" of male oppression of
women and male influence over the woman's world is so strong,
that the norms must be removed in order for the authentic voice of
women to be heard. 122 As a whole, this framework sees the idea of
an objective reality as a subjective experience that mirrors and
conforms to the male point of view. 23 Within this "objectivity,"
24
women are relegated to a different, separate, and unequal sphere.
Indeed, some of the harshest criticism of Ginsburg leaks
from the pens of dominance theorists. 125 David Cole, for example,
117

Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Authenticity in AT THE BOUNDARIES

OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 135, 141 (Martha Albertson Fineman &

Nancy Sweet Thomadsen 1991).
s"e Supra note 8, at 238.
119 See generally, Ann Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L. J.
375 (1981) [hereinafter Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence]; Nadine Taub,
Symposium on Reproductive Rights: the Emerging Issues, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L.
REP. 169 (1982).
12 Supra note 124, at 384.
121Cathy J. Jones, Sexist Language: An Overview for Teachers and Librarians,
86
LAW LIBR. J. 673, 681 (1990).
122 Supra note 122, at 141.
123Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, and Method, and the State: An
Agenda for Theory, J. WOMEN INCULTURE& Soc'Y 515, 536-44 (1982).
12

id.

125See

e.g., David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigatingfor Women's Rights
in a Man's World, 2 LAW & INEQ. 33(1984). Cole argues that, faced with the
precedents where the Court denied complaints of sex discrimination by citing
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argues that by working from standards set by men, sex
discrimination law demands that women present themselves as
"similarly situated" to men before they can be considered worthy of
equal treatment. 26
However, when Ginsburg addressed the
Supreme Court with the invidious effects of sexism, her classic
argument was to insist that women were like men by arguing on
behalf of a male plaintiff, or showing that men suffered like men
by arguing on behalf of male plaintiff, or showing that men
suffered harm through the execution of "benign" laws. 127 Cole
criticizes Ginsburg's assimilationist method because it fails to
address the fact that "neutrality" must be redefined to recognized
the inherent paternalism of benign discrimination and to account
128
for both women's experience as well as men's experience.
Cole's argument can be extended to Ginsburg's entire feminist
philosophy: for her, the end of feminism is "equality," whether is
occurs through the courts, legislation, or an Equal Rights
Amendment, and that equality consists of elevating women's rights
to meet the male standard.

women's differences, Ginsburg orchestrated a different approach of emphasizing
the similarities between men and women. For Ginsburg, litigating in a man's
world meant rejecting difference theory. Id. at 53-54. However, he charges that
the "assimilationist method" cannot traverse the expanse of women's rights
issues, especially reproductive freedom. Id. at 55. Indeed, while Ginsburg's
intentional use of male plaintiffs to secure "equal" rights for women may have
met with limited success, according to Cole it fails to accommodate women's
"irreducible differences." Id. at 95.
Id. at 34.
127 Id. at 55; In Frontiero v. Richardson, the man served as the critical link
by
concretely refuting the stereotyped assumption of the statute: women are
financially dependent upon their husbands, not the other way around. Id. at 5960. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld and Califano v. Goldfarb were aimed at
eradicating discriminatory provisions of the Social Security Act, but both
portrayed male plaintiffs as victims of discrimination under the act. Id. at 71-2.
Finally, when the Court finally articulated a heightened standard of review for
8
discrimination cases in Craig, the plaintiff, again, was a male. Id. at 80.
fender
1d. at38.
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SECION II

Ginsburg's Role Orientation and Judicial Philosophy
Understanding Ginsburg's judicial philosophy and judicial
role orientation are key means of analyzing her voting behavior.
This section evaluates Ginsburg's written and oral statements
about judicial prerogative and her actions as a jurist to assess the
accuracy of her self-characterization as exercising restraint.
A Critical Mass
Predicting that Court observers would confuse the two
women, the National Association of Women Judges, presented
newly confirmed Justice Ginsburg with a t-shirt that read, "I'm
Ruth, not Sandra."' 129 This commentary critiques not only the
gender makeup of the Supreme Court, but the disparity between the
genders in the federal judiciary as a whole. 13 Early in her
Supreme Court career, Ginsburg commended Clinton's
appointment of unprecedented numbers of women to federal courts
as bringing the federal courts a step closer to being "in touch with
the diverse society law exists to serve. ' 3 However, she was
skeptical that women in the federal judiciary would soon constitute
a critical mass.' 32 In 1999, Ginsburg again spoke on the critical
mass of women on the judiciary. 133 While she praised Clinton's
continued appointments of women to the federal bench - nearly
thirty percent of his total appointments as of July 1998 - she
rhetorically implored "Are we really there?"' 34 Given that men and
women in judicial power today learned from textbooks with
229

Ginsburg, Special Committee on Gender, supra note 116, at 1653.

30 As late as 1999, she remarked that, with some regularity, she is still addressed
as Justice O'Connor. Ginsburg, Facing the Millennium, supra note 31, at 1164.
131 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185
(1992) [hereinafter Judicial Voice].
232 Ginsburg, Special Committee on Gender, supra note 116, at 1653.
233 Ginsburg, Facing the Millennium, supra note 31, at 1164.
13 id.
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135
routinely declared the propriety of female subordination,
Ginsburg maintains that even if women did occupy a proportional
number of seats in the judiciary, there is not a clear basis of review
from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments for judges to treat
gender equal protection problems uniformly. 136 To rectify this
dilemma, she continues to advocate ratification of an Equal Rights
Amendment to complement the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
and to provide jurists with a clear guidepost when ruling on gender
issues.
Ginsburg's continued support of an Equal Rights
Amendment rather than the pursuit of gender equality through the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, echoes the
hesitancy of former Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell who, in
his concurring opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, stated that the
latter would "shape new constitutional doctrine without a firm root
for that doctrine."' 38 Ginsburg credits the expansion of the Court's
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to include gender
discrimination with jurists' awareness of a changing political
atmosphere. 39 Adding her own twist to the philosophy of legal
realists, she maintains that the tide of justices' attitudes are
"affected, not by the weather of the day.., but the climate of the
era." 140

Change Law Slowly
In "Speaking in a Judicial Voice," an article that was
published mere months before her nomination to the Supreme
Court, Ginsburg reiterates two positions that she feels are critical
135 Ginsburg often cites a widely used property textbook from the late 1960s
which declared that "land, like woman, was meant to be possessed." Ginsburg,
Special Committee on Gender, supra note 141, at 1654. (citing CURTIS J.
BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 139 (1968).

Ginsburg, The State of the Art, supra note 77, at 361.
136
137 id.
138 Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 48, at 474-475.
139 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a
Means of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 263 (1997).

140id.
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for a strong judiciary: (1) the importance of a judiciary which
recognizes its interdependence on the other branches of the
political system; and (2) the significance of collegiality among
judges.' 4' Ginsburg's caution is evident in her insistence that law
develop slowly rather than as a result of sweeping changes of a
judicial pen. Indeed, as a litigator, a jurist, and a scholar, Ginsburg
has warned that the law must evolve slowly to be effective. In the
1970s, as a litigator, she insisted that the WRP choose cases that
move the law forward incrementally. In a 1987 article on the
Intercircuit Committee, Ginsburg, at that time an appellate court
judge, commented that "the Supreme Court remains a vehicle for
gradual, considered change, at least under the open-ended
mandates of the Bill of Rights and similarly general statutes and
the common law."' 42 However, Ginsburg's scholarly criticism of
Roe v. Wade is the most telling example of her desire for glacial
changes in case law. She believes that the issue was not ripe when
the justices heard the case, and the Court sought to change the law
to far, too quickly. In her writings on this case, 1 43 Ginsburg
engages in a "what if" speculation about reproductive rights had
Roe not been decided the way it was.144 Furthermore, Ginsburg
charges that the courts paradoxically treat gender discrimination
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but uphold reproductive rights under substantive due process and
the right to privacy. 145 The latter, she argues, is a far weaker basis
:41Ginsburg, Judicial Voice,
42 Ruth Bader Ginsburg &

supra note 131, at 1185.
Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100

HARL.
REV. 1417, 1427 (1987).
143"Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade" in
farticular.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation
to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 374, 374-5 (1985); Had the Court not been so
specific, particularly about the trimester approach, would state legislatures have
gradually enacted laws that would have been more enduring than Roe? Id.
Would the abortion-rights movement not have become as complacent if it felt the
issue was not resolved by the decision? Id. Would the anti-abortion movement
have been less tenacious without a single decision to rally behind? Id.
145id.
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as it hinges on a premise of judicial creation while the46former
offers the stronger backing of a constitutional amendment.1
Ginsburg's reproductive rights jurisprudence provides
merely one example of her reluctance to wander too far from the
established path of precedent. In addition, she firmly believes that
the Court should "reinforce" or, at most, "moderately add impetus"
to social change. 147 She maintains that the decisions of the Court
between 1971 and 1980 do not represent great leaps in
jurisprudence, but instead demonstrate that the justices were slowly
responding to social change, and that her role was merely to be the
impetus for that change. 48 As they became cognizant that laws
designed to help women often had a negative effect, the justices
were able to construct a constitutional doctrine to counter the
149
injustice that had plagued the female sex.
The Jurist
One way that Ginsburg has attempted to eschew labels is by
"reinventing" traditional concepts.
In "Styles of Collegial
Judging," Ginsburg expounds on a judicial role orientation model
that she claims is more meaningful than that of activist versus
restraint or strict versus loose constructionists.! 50 She finds the
"individualist" versus "institutionally-minded" dichotomy far more
accurate. 15 1 American jurisprudence, says Ginsburg, leans toward
I4 d.
147

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication as a Means of Realizing

the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 14 TOCQUEV.LLE REv.
125, 134 (1993).
148 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks On Women Becoming
Part of the
Constitution,
6
LAW
&
INEQ.
17,
20-21
(1988).
149

id.

Is0 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Styles of Collegial Judging: One Judge's Perspective,
39 FEDERAL BAR NEws & J. 199 (1992) [hereinafter CollegialJudging].

151 Id. According to Ginsburg, individualist judges deliver separate judgments
without a desire to reconcile their differences with other jurists. Generally
speaking, this is exemplified by the Law Lords of Great Britain's Supreme Court,
Ginsburg cites Justice Hugo Black as an example of this style as he sought
answers to constitutional questions without much concern for the input of his
colleagues. Institutionally minded judging yields a collective judgment in which

disagreement is not made public as in the French system.
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institutionally-minded judging, but there is no explicit constraint
on a jurist who wishes to write separately.' 52 Collective agreement
with room for measured dissent seems to be Ginsburg's preferred
method of judging.
Ginsburg is known for her advocacy of a collegial court.
As a judge, she hoped that shorter per curiam opinions for
unanimous panels in the D.C. Court of Appeals would increase
unity. 153 She has said that the Supreme Court retains the most
legitimacy when separate opinions are utilized sparingly,' 54 and,
when used, the dissenting justice should not castigate the opinion
of the majority, but affirm her own view.' 5 According to
Ginsburg, a justice should utilize dissents to make consistent
statements on "major matters."'156 While she admits that a dissent
may be therapeutic for the writer, it takes away
from a jurist's
57
limited time and loses potency when overused.
A Liberal of a Conservative Approach?
In reference to her judicial philosophy, Ginsburg states:
"My approach, I believe, is neither liberal nor conservative active.
Rather, it is rooted in the place of the judiciary of judges in our
democratic society."' 5 8 But, what, exactly, is the place of the
judiciary in a democratic society? At her hearings, Ginsburg
quoted Alexander Hamilton as saying a judge should administer
152

id.

153 Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 131, at 1192. The potential success of

her proposal is unknown because it was rejected.
154 Id. "[O]verindulgence in separate opinion writing may undermine both the
reputation of the judiciary for judgment and the respect accorded court
dispositions."
15 Id. at 1197.
156 She points to William Brennan's repeated dissent in death penalty cases
as an
example. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks On Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L.
REV. 141, 143 (1990) [hereinafter Writing Separately].
157 Ginsburg, Collegial Judging, supra note 150, at 201. As a Supreme Court
justice, Ginsburg has not overindulged in separate opinions, though she does not
abstain significantly more than her colleagues. From the 1993 to 1997 terms of
the Supreme Court, the justice averaged about 13 separate opinions per term;
Ginsburg averaged 12. Leading Cases, HAR. L. REV. 1994-1998.
158 Ginsburg, Writing Separately, supra note 156, at 143.
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the law impartially. 159 She continued by expounding on the internal
limitations that a jurist should observe:
[T]he judge should carry out [her] function without
fanfare, but with due care. She should decide the
case before her without reaching out to cover cases
not seen. She should be ever mindful, as Judge and
then Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo said:
'Justice is not to be taken by storm. She is to be
wooed by slow advance.'160
Ginsburg also remarked that "the judiciary is third in line"
in the Constitution.' 6 1 She states that the document begins with
"We the People," flows into the responsibilities of their elected
representatives, and ends with the obligations of the judicial
branch.'62 She suggests that the structure was no accident, but an
intentional act by the framers. Setting the judiciary "apart from the
political fray"'163 allowed the members of this institution to "judge
fairly, impartially, in accordance with the law,
and without fear
164
group."
appreciated
any
of
about the animosity
Judicial Construction
In "Speaking in a Judicial Voice," Ginsburg claims that she
does not consider the Framers' intent in her constitutional decisionmaking.' 65 Instead, she believes that judges are true to the
"original understanding" when they "adhere to traditional ways
courts have realized the expectation Madison expressed"'166 when
he urged jurists to be "guardians"'167 of and "impenetrable
159 Confirmation of Ruth Bader Ginsburg as Supreme Court Justice. Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee. July 20, 1993. 103rd Congress. (Statement of Ruth
Bader Ginsburg)
161id.

162 id.
163
Id.
165 Ginsburg, JudicialVoice, supra note 131, at 1186.
166id.
167
Id.
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bulwark"'168 defending the rights embodied in the Bill of Rights. 169
As Ginsburg says in United States v. Virginia, she sees the
Constitutional history of the United States as the extension of
original rights to once-excluded groups. 170 Thus, Ginsburg views
the Constitution as an evolving document, intended to endure for
ages to come and sees the role of the federal courts in that
evolution as1 one "in touch with the diverse society [the] law exists
' 17
to serve."

While she claims some adherence to original intent,
Ginsburg does not deny that judges are policymakers. 172 Even
though judges do not solicit cases or choose litigants, policymaking
by those who don the black robes dates back to Marbury v.
Madison173 in i 803.174 In light of the diverse set of plaintiffs that
bring suit on assorted issues demanding judicial intervention,
Ginsburg maintains that a jurist's focus should be on the larger
175
constitutional issues rather than his or her personal preferences.
In addition, she believes that jurists should consider congressional
intent when determining the constitutionality of laws. For example,
' Id.
169 Id. She qualifies this statement with a reference to Charles Evans Hughes'
1934 opinion in Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 298 U.S. 398, 443
(1934), when he rejects the interpretations of the Framers as controlled by the
conditions and outlook of their time. Id. at 1187.
170 518 U.S. at 557.
:71 Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 131, at 1187.
172 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial Activism: A "Liberal"
or
"Conservative" Technique?, 15 GEORGIA L. REV. 539, 540 (1981) [hereinafter
JudicialActivism].
173 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
174 Ginsburg, JudicialActivism, supra note 172, at 540.
175 Id. at 546. However, she does admit that judges often have no choice but to
make policy decisions when legislatures delegate broad authority in general
terms. Id. at 547. Ginsburg utilizes the 1975 D.C. Court of Appeals decision
Rodway v. United States Department of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir.
1975), to exemplify this notion. Id. at 548. In amending the Food Stamp Act in
1971, the Senate adopted a far more generous allotment per family than the
House. The concrete proposal to split the difference at conference was not
accepted and the Act was left with the vague instruction that recipients receive
the "opportunity to obtain a nutritionally adequate diet." Id. When the case went
before the appellate court, the judges were forced to make political decisions that
the legislators declined to make.
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when Senator Edward Kennedy asked Ginsburg to discuss her view
of the Court's majority approach to constructing civil rights law in
employment discrimination cases she said that "it is the obligation
of judges to construe statutes in the way that Congress meant7 7them
to be construed"'176 and to be mindful of the spirit of the law.
Supreme Court Confirmation Congressional Hearings
Clearly Ginsburg sought to portray herself at her Supreme
Court confirmation hearings as a measured and consistent jurist
who seeks the middle road and dutifully follows judicial
restraint.'7 8 While hopeful judicial candidates often seek to
illuminate themselves in the soft, appealing glow of judicial
restraint before the Judiciary Committee, it was of particular
importance in Ginsburg's case. Undoubtedly, her potential
opposition on the Committee had doubts about how a person who
formerly works as a strong proponent of women's rights and who
appeared before the Supreme Court as an advocate six times, could
claim to be a follower of judicial restraint in her capacity as judge.
As if to preempt this criticism, Ginsburg carefully distinguished
her role as an advocate from that of judge in her opening
statements at her confirmation hearings, reminding the Committee
that, in spite of her positions as litigator, she "[came] to [the]
17 9
proceeding to be judged as a judge, not an advocate."
176

Confirmation of Ruth Bader Ginsburg as Supreme Court Justice. Before the

Senate Judiciary Committee. July 22, 1993. 103rd Congress.
177 id.
178 Because of Ginsburg's moderate voting record as a U.S. Circuit Court
judge
and her commitment to sweeping changes in judicial restraint, scholars such as
Shelia Smith have been reluctant to predict that Ginsburg will initiate sweeping
changes in gender discrimination law. Smith, supra note 90, at 1950-55. Rather,
she hypothesizes that if any expansion in equal protection occurs, it will be in the
area of sexual harassment law because Supreme Court precedent in this area of
law is scattered and the legislative intent of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Title IX of the Education Act of 1972 to eliminate gender
discrimination in employment and education is extensive. Id. at 1943-45.
179 Confirmation of Ruth Bader Ginsburg as Supreme Court Justice. Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee. July 20, 1993. 103rd Congress. (Statement of Ruth
Bader Ginsburg)
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Yet, while reminding the Judiciary Committee that it had
access to volumes of her speeches, writings, and appellate
80
decisions, Ginsburg would "offer no forecasts, no hints"'1
regarding how she would vote on particular issues to which she
had not specifically spoken previously, as it would cause her to act
"injudiciously."' 8'1 She remained steadfast to her initial assertion
throughout the course of the hearings. As the Senators focused
their questioning on her positions on abortion and women's rights,
she did not shy away from what she had written and said about
reproductive choice, maintaining her defense of abortion as well as
her distaste for Roe. Yet she remained relatively ambiguous when
questioned about discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation,18 2 and also refused to preview her votes on the death
penalty. At one point she responded that that she does not think
that it is appropriate for jurists to decide issues based on a set of
hypotheticals or to prejudge any issue, and that a jurist's votes
83
should transcend her own opinions and reflect precedent.'
Ginsburg's written and spoken record indicates a wont
toward restraint. She has said that judges should limit their
decisions and not attempt to decide things beyond the case at hand.
At her hearings, she indicated that a jurist should decide cases
based on precedent, not on her own opinions. Her desire for a
constitutional amendment to secure women's equality suggests that
the judiciary should follow the lead of the popularly elected
branches instead of initiating change itself. Instead of giant leaps
in case law, she suggests that the courts are most effective when
the law changes slowly.
'so Id.
181

Id.

182

Id. Though vague, her assertion suggests that something, perhaps her own

encounters with discrimination, has made her aware of the pervasiveness of
discrimination in society and also indicates that she would interpret the
Constitution in a way that would correct such discrimination. She said that she
believes "rank discrimination against anyone is against the tradition of the
United States and it is to be deplored. Rank discrimination is not part of our
nation's culture. Tolerance is."
183 Id. "My own view on the death penalty, I think, is not relevant to any question
that I would be asked to decide as a judge. I will be scrupulous in applying the
law on the basis of legislation and precedent."
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Ginsburg has not readily shed all of her earlier activist
inclinations. She hints, however unknowingly, at activism when
she suggests that the Constitution is an evolving document.
Furthermore, her footnote in Harrisv. Forklift Sys.' leaves open
the possibility for future expansion regarding women's rights:
"[E]ven under the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, when
requires 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' for a genderbased classification, it remains an open question whether
'classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect. ' ' l85 Yet,
to this point is it still little more than a hint.
SECTION III
Sex Discrimination, the Fourteenth Amendment, and United
States v. Virginia
In a constitutional law casebook published in 1987, Robert
Cushman noted that "until [Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan186 in 1982], a state could still establish a one-sex school."' 8 7
However, while the Hogan Court found single-sex admissions
policies at state supported colleges in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it seemed to allow
a loophole exempting military colleges, such as the Citadel and the
Virginia Military Institute which admitted only men, from
conforming to the decision. Ironically, years later, it was one of
Cushman's former students who authored the majority opinion in
United States v. Virginia which finally sounded the death knell for
8
all state sponsored single-sex institutions of higher learning.18
' 84 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
115 id. at 26.
186 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
187 ROBERT F. CUSHMAN, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 516 (1987).
188 Between 1980, the year that Ginsburg was appointed to the D.C. Circuit

Court of Appeals, and 1993, the year that she was appointed to the Supreme
Court, the Court decided a series of cases which further defined the limits to
which one could claim protection from gender discrimination.
In 1981, the Court rendered three such decisions, Kirchberg v. Feenstra,
450 U.S. 455 (1981), Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464
(1981), and Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). In Kirchberg, the Court, in
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an opinion written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, invalidated a statute that
granted husbands the right to serve as "head and master" over property owned
jointly by a couple, and to dispose of it without their spouses' consent.
Michael M. presented an equal protection challenge to California's
statutory rape law. The law provided that, when a male and female between the
ages of fourteen and seventeen engaged in sexual intercourse, the male was
guilty of statutory rape was not. The majority upheld the law using the Craig v.
Boren intermediate scrutiny test. The prevention of teenage pregnancy, said the
plurality, was an important governmental interest which was "substantially
furthered" by this statute, since females and males were not similarly situated
regarding the effects of pregnancy. In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens
criticized the majority for overlooking the concept that "a rule authorizing
punishment of only one of two equally guilty wrongdoers violates the essence of
the constitutional requirement that the sovereign must govern impartially," 450
U.S. 464, 502 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice William Brennan's dissent
charged that the majority upheld the law, not based on precedent, but on "sexual
stereotypes," Id. at 488 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In Rostker, the Court rejected Goldberg's assertion that male-only
conscription was unconstitutional based on the equal protection principle
contained in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The majority reasoned
that judicial deference is at is peak when the Court is considering the combined
executive-legislative power over national security. Likewise, the "heightened
scrutiny" test articulated in Craig v. Boren was satisfied because military
flexibility was an important government goal.
The following year in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982), the Court applied the intermediate scrutiny standard to the college's
female-only admissions policy finding that the exclusion of men from a nursing
college did not, as the state claimed, compensate women for discrimination
against them. The Court found that the policy did not "substantially further" the
alleged objective since men were permitted to attend classes as auditors.
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), was the first time
that the Supreme Court confirmed that a supervisor's advances the retaliation
constituted sex-discrimination: "Without questions, when a supervisors sexually
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminates' on the basis of sex," 477 U.S. at 64. Finally, in 1992, in Franklin
v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), the Court held that a
litigant can seek monetary damages under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.
In addition, before VMI but during Ginsburg's first two terms as
justice, the Court decided three cases that further refined the standard of scrutiny
for gender discrimination. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993), the
Court found that in making an "abusive work environment" harassment claim, a
plaintiff need not necessarily demonstrate that the conduct of the employer
"'seriously affect[ed]' [an employee's] psychological well-being or cause the
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89
VMI Case History

The Virginia Military Institute is a rare and prestigious
military college which operated as a single-sex school since its
creation in 1839.19° Its mission is to produce "citizen soldiers:"
men who are suited for military and civilian leadership.' 9 1 To
accomplish this, VMI employs an "adversative method" of
education which stresses character development, physical and
mental discipline, and a strong moral code designed to instill in its
92
students the capacity to deal with duress and stress as leaders.'

plaintiff to 'suffer injury,"' 510 U.S. at 22 (1993). Ginsburg offers a brief
concurrence in Harris in which she applauds the Court's reaffirmation of
Meritor. Yet, in a footnote, she leaves open the possibility for future expansion:
"[E]ven under the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, which requires 'an
exceedingly persuasive justification' for a gender-based classification, it remains
an open question whether 'classifications based upon gender are inherently
suspect,'" Id. at 26. J.E.B. v. Alabama Ex. Rel T.B, 511 U.S. 127 (1994),
addressed gender discrimination in jury selection. The Court extended to gender
the 1986 decision of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which held that
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the use of peremptory challenges on the
basis of race. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the Court
found that the 1991 Civil Rights Act does not apply to cases pending on appeal
at the time of enactment.
Though she voted with the majority in these cases, Ginsburg was a judicial
onlooker because each time another justice was assigned to author the opinion of
the Court. It was not until United States v. Virginia in 1996 that the Chief
Justice assigned the opinion to the Court's leading authority on gender
discrimination jurisprudence.
189 Before reaching the Supreme Court, this case made its way through the lower
courts twice.
'90 518 U.S. 515, 520 (1996).
191Id.
192 Id. At the District Court trial Colonel Normal Bissell, the Commandant of
Cadets at VMI, stated "I like to think VMI literally dissects the young student
that comes in there, kind of pulls him apart, and through the stress, everything

that goes on in that environment, would teach him to know everything about
himself," 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va. 1991).
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The United States Files Suit
VMI I: District Court
In 1990, a female high-school student, seeking admission to
VMI, filed a complaint with the Attorney General on the grounds
that Virginia's all-male military academy violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The action
prompted the United States to file suit against Virginia and the
school. Reasoning that Virginia met the burden of proof required
by Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, the District Court for
the Western District of Virginia ruled in favor of the
Commonwealth. 93 Ultimately, the District Court reasoned that
Virginia's interest of providing a "single-gender environment, be it
male or female"' 94 provided important benefits consistent with the
Supreme Court's ruling in Hogan.195 While the trial court did find
that "women are denied a unique educational opportunity that is
available only at VMI,"' 96 it concluded that integrating them into
the school would have a97detrimental effect on the school's status
and method of teaching. 1
The District Court distinguished the cases on two grounds. First, in Hogan,
where the Court found that the women-only admission policy of the statesupported Mississippi University for Women nursing school violated the equal
protection clause, it was not necessary to exclude men from the program to
advance the education goals of the institution. Id. at 1410. However, VMI
asserted that the program would be fundamentally altered if the college was
forced to admit women. Id. Second, according to the district court, the reasons
that the two schools gave defending their single-sex admissions policies differed
substantially. The Mississippi University for Women asserted that its femaleonly admission policy was justified as a form of compensatory affirmative
action. Id. On the other hand, VMI alleged that its male-only admission policy
diversified the state's educational system. Id, Indeed, VMI was the only one of
Virginia's fifteen public colleges and universities that catered only to one sex.
193

Id. at 1415.
195Id.
'94

I96
Id. at 1432.
197 Id. For example, the district court claimed that "allowance for personal
privacy would have to be made," Id. at 1412, and "physical education
requirements would have to be altered, at least for women," Id. at 1413.
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VMI I: Court of Appeals
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the fourth circuit
vacated the District Court's judgment, holding that Virginia could
not favor one gender in educational opportunities. 19 The case was
remanded, and the court instructed Virginia to comply with one of
three remedies: to admit women to VMI, to establish a parallel
institution for women, or to abandon state support for the
institution. 199
The Remedial Approach
VMI II: District Court
In response to the appellate court ruling, the state created
the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) at Mary
Baldwin College, a four-year private liberal arts college for
women. On remand, the District Court ruled that the plan satisfied
the equal protection clause. 200 While the court found that the
201
VWIL plan did not "provide a mirror image of VMI for women,
it felt that the outcomes were "substantially similar, 20 2 concluding
that "if VMI marches to the beat of a drum, then Mary Baldwin
marches to the melody of a fife and when the march is over, both
20 3
will have arrived at the same destination."
VMI 11: Court of Appeals
The United States again appealed to the court of appeals.
This time, however, the fourth circuit affirmed the trial court's
judgment. Even though it recognized that a degree from VWIL
19s United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 1992) "The
Commonwealth of Virginia has not... advanced any state policy by which it can
justify its determination under an announced policy of diversity, to afford VMI's
unique type of program to men and not to women.
'99 id. at 899.
m United States v. Virginia II, 852 F. Supp. 471,473 (W.D. Va. 1994).
2o'
Id. at 481.
20 2
id.
203 Id. at 484.
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"lacks the historical benefit and prestige" 2°4 of a degree from VMI,
it held that the educational opportunities were "sufficiently
comparable. ' ,20 5 The court also altered its previous application of
the important governmental interest/substantially related means test
by deferring to the "democratically chosen branch. ''206 Instead of
focusing on the end, the court held that the means should be more
carefully scrutinized. 2° 7 The 2United
States proceeded to appeal the
08
Court.
Supreme
ruling to the
The Supreme Court Addresses VMI
In a 7-1 decision, the Supreme Court found VMI's singlesex admission policy unconstitutional. 2°9 Ginsburg's subtly
heightened form of the "important governmental interest with
substantially related means test,"210 discredited both of Virginia's
objectives and ruled that denying women admission to VMI
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 21 1 Thus, Ginsburg alters the standard by which
204 United States v. Virginia II, 44 F.3d 1229, 1241 (4'"
Cir. 1995).
5 Id.

26 id. at 1236-7.
2W Id. However, the fourth circuit was not unanimous. In a biting dissent, Judge

Phillips criticized the court for not holding Virginia to the burden of showing the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" outlined in Hogan. Id. at 1247. In his
view, short of integrating women into VMI itself, Virginia could meet the Hogan
standard only by providing women with "substantially comparable curricular and
extra-curricular programs, funding, physical plant, administration and support
services, and faculty and library resources." Id. at 1250.
2m The Court agreed to address two issues: (1) Does Virginia's exclusion of all
women, regardless of ability, from the educational opportunities provided by
VMI violate the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment? (2) If so, what is the remedial requirement?
209 Ginsburg's majority opinion garnered the support of five of her colleagues:
Breyer, Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter, and Stevens. Rehnquist filed a concurring
opinion and Scalia dissented. Thomas recused himself because his son attended
VMI. Shannon M. Gregor, The Virginia Military Institute is Given the
Opportunity to Create "Citizen Soldiers" Out of Qualified Women, 73 N. DAK.
L. REV. 323, 328 (1997).
210 She also refers to this as "skeptical scrutiny," 518 U.S. at 518.
211 Virginia

offered two justifications for excluding women from the school:

First, Virginia claimed that single-gender education provided educational
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gender discrimination claims are reviewed in two significant ways.
First, the state must present an "exceedingly persuasive"
justification for maintaining a gender-based practice. That is, it
must show at least that the sex-based classification serves
important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives. Second, the objective must be genuine and not
based on stereotypical notions about women. The test inherently
requires the judge to begin with a strong presumption that the
classification is invalid.
In effect, skeptical scrutiny becomes
intermediate plus: a standard not quite as strong as strict scrutiny,
but with more teeth than pre-VMI intermediate scrutiny.
The
majority opinion
finds
Virginia's
actions
unconstitutional in three steps.
First, the Court requires a
successful defense of gender-based classification to show and
"exceedingly persuasive justification." Second, the Court rejects
Virginia's proffered objective of diversity in the education system
because there is no historical evidence that this has ever been the
Commonwealth's intent in maintaining the school.21 3 Finally, the
Court rejected the remedial plan on the basis that the program was
inferior in prestige, academics, and funding.
Ginsburg begins her opinion by outlining the differences
and the resulting inequalities of the two schools by examining their
"academic offerings, methods of education, and financial
resources." 2 4 She addresses Virginia's reasons for not accepting
benefits and contributed to diversity in the Commonwealth's education system.
Second, the Commonwealth argued that admitting women would force VMI to
modify its unique style of education, compromising its reputation. Id. at 525.
212 Deborah A. Widiss, Re-viewing History: The Use of the Past as Negative
Precedentin United States v. Virginia, 108 YALE L. J. 238, 249 (1998).
213 However, even if this was an objective, the school only provided diversity
for
males.
214 518 U.S. at 526. She points to a variety of tangible and intangible inequalities
in the schools. The average SAT scores for freshmen at Mary Baldwin was
about 100 points lower than at VMI. The faculty at Mary Baldwin held fewer
Ph.D.'s than at VMI and received lower salaries. The women's college did not
offer degrees in the sciences or in engineering. The Court also noted the large
discrepancy in endowment between the two schools: Mary Baldwin's
endowment was about $19 million with the prospect of adding $35 million based
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women and concludes that, while single-sex education does afford
benefits to some students and "diversity among public educational
institutions can serve the public good, ''215 Virginia does not show
that "VMI was established, or has been maintained, with a view of
diversifying, by its categorical exclusion of women, educational
opportunities within the Commonwealth. ' ,21 6 In reference to
Virginia's claim that admitting women would mean changes to the
adversative method rendering it beyond recognition, Ginsburg
countered that it is undisputed that some women are capable of
meeting the challenges of the method.217 In her conclusion to this
section, she rebukes Virginia
for focusing their argument on
' 2t8
"means rather than end."

Ginsburg's opinion designates the exceedingly persuasive
justification language as the "core instruction of [the] Court's path
marking decisions." 219 This specification elevates the phrase from
an adjective in the subtext of the standard two-prong Hogan test, to
an independent focus in the new "skeptical scrutiny" test. Yet,
"exceedingly persuasive" is a highly amorphous and incredibly
subjective term. The only concrete guideposts that Ginsburg offers
on future commitments. On the other hand, VMI had an endowment of $131
million with $220 million in future commitments. Instead of stressful physical
and mental training which is the hallmark of VMI, the VWIL Task Force, which
designed the VWIL program, favored "'a cooperative method which reinforces
self-esteem' for the women. It was proposed, then, that the women at VWIL
learn their leadership skills through seminars and externships. The would not
have been required to eat or live together as the cadets at VMI. Finally, the
military component at Mary Baldwin was only ceremonial, while it was a
fundamental aspect of a VMI education. Id. at 526-7.
215 Id. at 535.
216

Id. When VMI was founded in 1839, Virginia was far from considering the

educational opportunities of women. The prospect of providing for the higher
education of women in the Commonwealth was not even raised by the State
Senate until 1879, and even then no new opportunities for women were
immediately allowed. Furthermore, VMI continued to remain a single-sex
institution based on an inherently sexist tradition, not as a program of diversity.
Id. at 536-537.
217 Id. at 540-4. She notes that similar arguments and predictions were made
when women first sought entry to federal military academies.
218 Id. at 545. This is exactly the opposite of the appellate court's instruction.
219 Id. at 525.
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come in the form of attacks on two objectives asserted by Virginia:
(1) that the adversative method is harmful for women and (2) that
admitting women would be harmful to the institution. 220 At the
trial stage, Virginia drew on contemporary "experts" in the field of
education who testified that the adversative atmosphere at VMI
would be harmful to women who require a "cooperative
atmosphere." 221 To discredit this claim, Ginsburg juxtaposed the
arguments of Virginia's experts with experts on women and
education in the mid-nineteenth century who believed that higher
education for women was harmful to female health.222 A century of
coeducation has made it clear that the process does not harm
women as the "experts" feared.223 Ginsburg also recites fears from
the distant past about women entering law 224 and medicine, 225 as
well as more recent fears about women working as law
enforcement officers. 226 Essentially, the problem with Virginia's
remedy was not that it recognized a difference based on sex, but
220 Widiss, supra note 212, at 251.
' 518 U.S. at 541 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434
(W.D.Va. 1991).
2 The nineteenth century experts included Edward H. Clarke of Harvard
Medical School who, in his influential book Sex in Education, said "identical
education of the two sexes is a crime before God and humanity, that physiology
protests against, and that experience weeps over." 518 U.S. at n. 9 (quoting

EDWARD H. CLARKE, SEX IN EDUCATION 127 (1873). Henry Maudsley who said,

"it is not that girls have not ambition, nor that they fail generally to run the
intellectual race [in coeducational settings], but it is asserted that they do it at the
cost to their strength and health which entails life-long suffering, and even
incapacitates them for the adequate performance of the natural functions of their
sex," Id. (quoting HENRY MAUDSLEY, SEX IN MIND AND IN EDUCATION 17
(1874)); Charles D. Meigs, who said "after five or six weeks of 'mental and
educational discipline,' a healthy woman would 'lose . . the habit of
menstruation' and suffer numerous ills as a result of depriving her body for the
sake of her mind." Id. (quoting CHARLES D. MEIGS, REMALES AND THEIR
DISEASES 350 (1848)).
223 Widiss, supra note 212, at 254. Widiss calls this approach the "negative
precedent." She is careful to note, however, that Ginsburg does not discredit
history or case aside the achievements of past leaders, but she does insist that
one recognize the adverse impact that these actions had on women. Id. at 267.
224 518 U.S. at 543-544.
225 id.at 544.
226 Id. at 542.
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227
that it turned the difference into a disadvantage for one group.
While the Court does acknowledge the importance of diversity in
an educational system, it finds that Virginia fails to prove that
diversity is the actual purpose of the practice, and thus, it appears
to the Court to be merely a rationalization.
Second, the majority specifies that the states' asserted
objectives "must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc
in response to litigation, ' 228 and cannot rely on overly broad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females." 229 Virginia tried to convince the
Court that it was caught in a catch-22: since the adversative
method is harmful for women, if VMI is forced to admit women,
the system would have to be changed beyond recognition, thereby
harming the institution by destroying its prestige and reputation.
The Court refused to accept the premise on which Virginia's
argument was based. The majority stressed that state actors should
disregard the capabilities and preference of "average" men and
women, 230 as VMI's mission and approach might be appropriate
for and preferred by some women, just as it is preferred by some
men, and focus on the individuals who were otherwise qualified for
the program. 23 '
227

Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Leaving Things

Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 74-5 (1996). "Inherent differences remain
cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for
artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity," 518 U.S. at 536.

Furthermore, Ginsburg is careful to note that, while gender classifications may
not be used to discriminate against women, they "may be used to compensate
women 'for particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered, to promot[e]
equal employment opportunity, [and] to advance full development of the talent
and capacities of our Nation's people."' Id. at 525 (quoting Califano v. Webster,
430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam) and California Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc.
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987)). In this way, Ginsburg seeks to preempt
any attempt to utilize this decision to strike down affirmative action plans geared
to redress discrimination against women.
228 id. at 526.
229 id.
230 Indeed, the "average" women is no more or less suited for life at VMI as is
the "average" man.
231 "State actors controlling gates to opportunity ...may not exclude qualified
individuals based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males
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Once the Court determined that Virginia had violated the
Constitution by not providing an "exceedingly persuasive"
justification for excluding women, it concentrated on the remedy.
The majority found, however, that VWIL failed to meet the
remedial standard outlined in Milliken v. Bradley232 in which a
remedial degree "must be shaped to place persons
unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or advantage in 'the
position they would have occupied in the absence of
The majority found that VWIL was a poor
[discrimination].' ''233
234
substitute for VMI.
and females,"' Id. at 532 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 725 (1982)).
232 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
233 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. at 280).
2 Perhaps the best way to demonstrate how "skeptical scrutiny" differs from
traditional "intermediate scrutiny" is by applying the new test to Michael M. v.
Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, an earlier case in which a law that discriminated
on the basis of sex was upheld. Michael M. presented an equal protection
challenge to the statutory rape law of California. Under the law, when two
people between the ages of fourteen and seventeen engaged in consensual
heterosexual intercourse, the male was guilty of statutory rape but the female had
committed no crime. The law was designed to decrease teenage pregnancy
(though, arguably by a complex formula). The lawmakers reasoned that
absolving (pregnant) young women of guilt would provide an incentive for them
to turn in their cohorts, thereby increasing convictions, deterring teens from
having sex, and, ultimately, decreasing the number of teenage pregnancies. The
government argued that if the law was gender neutral, women would be deterred
from reporting the men. The California Supreme Court upheld the law using
strict scrutiny. The United States Supreme Court upheld the law using the Craig
test. The prevention of teenage pregnancy, said the plurality, was an important
governmental interest which was "substantially furthered" by the statute because
females and males were not similarly situated with regard to the burdens of
pregnancy.
Even though the law withstood this threshold of traditional intermediate
scrutiny, it would not necessarily survive skeptical scrutiny. Under the VMI
decision, the objective proffered by the state must be genuine and not based on
stereotypical notions about women. While the desire to reduce pregnancy was
doubtlessly a genuine objective by the state, that it nonetheless rests heavily on
two stereotypes. State policies that perpetuate antiquated and outdated gender
stereotypes that are derogatory and condescending toward women do not form
the basis for proper discriminatory purpose. First, the law, and the Court in its
analysis assume that women are inclined to tell on others when they risk
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Judicial Role Orientation, Feminism, and VMI
Ginsburg's opinion illustrates her judicial role orientation
as well as her feminist jurisprudence. She relies heavily on
precedent, particularly the Hogan decision. At the same time, she
tinkers with the Court's focus, elevating the phrase "exceedingly
persuasive justification" from an adjective modifying the standard
two-prong
test in Hogan to an additional, independent prong in
235
vMI.

Though deeply rooted in precedent, the additional
prohibitions that Ginsburg sets in place in VMI go a step further
than previous decisions by the Supreme Court to secure an even
higher standard of scrutiny in gender discrimination cases. Instead
of proscripting discrimination based on stereotypes, women could
not be categorically excluded on the basis of real, inherent
physiological differences between the sexes. 236 Ginsburg demands
that the objective be the actual one in mind at the time the
discriminatory classification was devised, thereby making the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" even more difficult to prove,
237
even without the full force of "strict" scrutiny.
In addition, Ginsburg's decision is consistent with several
of the goals that she held as litigator. The opinion disallows
benign, or "protective," justifications for gender discrimination in
embarrassment. Second and more importantly, the plurality assume that women
are not similarly situated because of pregnancy. As Blackmun points out in his
concurring opinion, the Court is partly to blame for this because it refused to
require Medicaid coverage for abortions. If women and men have essentially the
same control over their reproductive capabilities, the sexes are arguably similarly
situated.
235 Udell, New Direction, supra note 102, at 533; Kathryn A. Lee, Intermediate
Review "With Teeth" In Gender Discrimination Cases: The New Standard in
United States v. Virginia, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 221, 235 (1997).
236 Amy Walsh, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Extending the Constitution, 32 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 197, 218 (1998); Ginsburg says that while "sex
classification" can be used as grounds for compensating women for past wrongs,
it cannot be used to "create or perpetuate the legal, social and economic
inferiority of women," 518 U.S. at 533-4.
237 518 U.S. at 536.
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the law.238 Furthermore, while she concedes that most women
would not want to attend VMI and that the average woman would
not be able to meet the rigorous physical standards required by the
institution, she shifts the focus to women who would want to
attend by focusing on "whether the State can constitutionally deny
to women who have the will and capacity, the training and
attendant opportunity that VMI uniquely affords." 23 9 In this sense
she attempts to divorce the acceptability of traditional gender
stereotypes and generalizations from case law.
In analyzing the objectives that Virginia set forth for setting
up VWIL, Ginsburg reaffirms her belief in equal treatment of men
and women under the law. 24° She refutes Virginia's use of
supposed feminine "differences" to women's disadvantage.
Instead, she insists that the proposed remedy must be tailored to the
women who want to attend VMI and are capable of the system's
rigors, rather than holding all women to the lower standard of the
"average" woman. 24 1 As Ginsburg put it, "kept away from the
pressures, hazards and psychological bonding characteristic of
VMI's adversative training, VWIL students will not know the
'feeling of tremendous accomplishment' commonly experienced by
VMI's successful cadets." 242 At the same time, Ginsburg does not
treat men and women as interchangeables. She concedes that some
changes must be made to ensure privacy between the sexes, and
that some changes will have to be made in women's physical
regimen. The distinctions that she makes here are very similar to
the exceptions that she allowed when arguing for the ERA: the
"potty problem" 243 and legislation dealing with subjects that
2
inherently only affected one gender. 44
238

See e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classification in

the Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813 (1978).
2" 518 U.S. at 542.
239 Id.
240 See e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on the 1980s Debate of
SJecial Versus Equal Treatment for Women, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 143 (1986).
U.S. at 550.
242 518
Id. at 549.
243 She explains that the "ERA would c6exist peacefully with separate public
restrooms, separate sleeping and bathroom facilities for male and female military
personnel and prisoners." Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality Under the
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Some scholars question whether Ginsburg really
maximized her opportunity to make a statement about gender
discrimination and even whether the opinion actually changes the
standard at all. Cass Sunstein, professor of jurisprudence at the
University of Chicago, discusses the Court's rulings in VMI and
Romer v. Evans as essentially minimalist decisions.245 Specifically,
he places VMI in this category because it addressed the distinct
circumstances of VMI instead of single-sex education in general
and because the Court emphasized the lack of an actual purpose
promoting diversity without ruling that the objective itself was
unconstitutional .246
Other Opinions
Rehnquist's concurring opinion and Scalia's dissenting
opinion offer some insight into opposition to heightening the level
of scrutiny used in gender discrimination cases. In his concurrence,
Rehnquist focuses on the ambiguity of the majority's "exceedingly
persuasive justification" as the test that litigants must meet when
they classify on the basis of gender.2 7 Instead, he says that he
would have clung more closely to the "firmly established"
intermediate scrutiny test for the sake of clarity. 248 He states that
Virginia could have met the demand of the Constitution by
Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 175
(1979).

244 For example, laws dealing with subjects like sperm donation or pre-natal care
would be excepted. Id.
25 Sunstein, supra note 227, at 6. Sunstein's minimalist/maximalist approach
loosely resembles judicial restrain/activism. However, instead of labeling the

jurist, the decision is categorized. Thus, a jurist's approach can vary from case
to case. According to his dichotomy, minimalist judges "decide no more than
they have to decide," "leave things open," and "make deliberate decisions about
what should be left unsaid." Id. Maximalists assume an aggressive judicial
osture "necessary to promote the goals of deliberative democracy." Id. at 28.
Id. at 9-10.
27 While Rehnquist thinks that the term "substantially related to an important
governmental interest" from the traditional test is ambiguous enough, he believes
that it is more specific than the term "exceedingly persuasive justification." 518

U.S. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

2 8 id.
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demonstrating that "its interest in educating men in a single-sex
environment is matched by its interest in educating women in a
single-sex institution." 249 The two schools, he maintains, would not
have had to be equal in every aspect, only in "quality of education"
and "caliber." 250 Furthermore, Rehnquist disputes Ginsburg's
consideration of the history of the institution and the state before
the Supreme Court's decision in Hogan. After 1982, the state
should have been aware that the male-only policy at VMI was
constitutionally questionable, and was responsible only from that
point on to take steps necessary to create a similar institution
for
25
women to avoid violating the Equal Protection Clause. 1
In contrast, Scalia focuses on the ideological obstacles to
implementing strict scrutiny. 252 In a passionate dissent, he accuses
his colleagues of "rejecting the factual findings of the courts below,
sweeping aside the precedents of the Court, and ignoring the
history of our people."2 53 He believes that Virginia's proffered
objective of diversifying the educational system by maintaining a
single-sex school satisfied the "important governmental objective
with substantially related means" test. 254 He states that the Court
has found that strict scrutiny is inapplicable to sex-based
classifications, and that there is not a strong argument for
extending strict scrutiny to include gender.2 55 In fact, he feels that
at 565. Rehnquist is not alone in his allegation that the majority's decision
only asserted a more confusing standard in the case. Some scholars even assert
that VMI was not only unnecessarily confusing, but it also did not heighten the
standard of scrutiny for gender-based equal protection claims. David Bowsher,
Cracking the Code of the United States v. Virginia, 48 DUKE L. J. 305, 308
(1997).
250 518 U.S. at 565.
249Id.

251
252

id.

It should be noted from the outset that, much like Ginsburg's previous
experience with gender discrimination, Scalia's experience attending St. Francis
Xavier High School, a private, all-male military academy, likely influenced his
perception
of the case. Udell, supra note 102, at n. 214.
3
518 U.S. at 576 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24 id.
255 Id. at 574-575. In defense of his argument, Scalia cites the 1984
Supreme
Court case Heckler v. Matthews, 456 U.S. 728 (1984), in which the Court, using
intermediate scrutiny, found that a pension offset provision which applied to
nondependent men but not to nondependent women did not violate the due
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if the level of scrutiny should change at all, there is a stronger
argument for decreasing the standard of review to rationalbased. 256 In his opinion, fundamental rights should be limited 257
to
society."
our
by
protected
"traditionally
are
which
those rights
Scalia cites footnote number four in United States v. Carolene
Prod. Co.,258 which suggests that strict scrutiny may be used when
there is a "discrete and insular minority." 259 He finds it "hard to
consider women a 'discrete and insular minority' unable to employ
'the political processes ordinarily to be relied upon,' when they
constitute a majority of the electorate. ,260
Scalia also attempts to empirically prove that the majority
2
VI
is replacing the "important objective/substantially related" test' 262
"
justification.
with the term "exceedingly persuasive
Furthermore, he finds that Ginsburg's characterization of
"exceedingly persuasive justification" as the "core instruction" of
precedent before the Court
signified an extension of strict scrutiny
26 3
to gender classifications.

process clause of the Fifth Amendment. He also cites Michael M. v. Super. Ct.
of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981), in which the Court held that a statutory
rape law which applied only to men was constitutional.
2561d.

at

567.

257 id.

258 304

U.S. 144 (1938).

2 518 U.S. at 575 (citing United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144

(1938)).
26 id.

261 He

counts only two mentions of intermediate scrutiny. Furthermore, he
argues, it "never answered the question presented in anything resembling that
form and instead preferred the phase 'exceedingly persuasive justification' from
Hogan." Id. at 577.
262 He says that this phrase is invoked nine times in the course of the opinion of

the majority. Id.
263

Id. at 578.
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SECTION IV

Skeptical of "Skeptical" Scrutiny: Lower Courts Interpret
VMI
The Supreme Court's ruling in VMI forever changed the
complexion of the Virginia Military Institute. 26 On August 18,
1997, the first coed class assembled at the institution, and in March
of the following year, 23 of the original 30 women and 361 of 430
men remained.
However, understanding the impact of a case
reaches beyond the immediate, or even long-term, effect on the
parties involved. 26 6 For that reason, this section analyzes federal
district and circuit court opinions in cases involving gender
discrimination to determine how VMI has been interpreted at lower
levels of the judicial system.
Impact is analyzed in this project by examining each case's
citation or failure of citation of VMI and the case's ultimate
holding. Accordingly, each case is classified in one of five
categories: interpreting the VMI standard as granting gender
discrimination cases strict scrutiny, finding that the VMI standard
calls for intermediate scrutiny plus, citing VMI as the Court's most
recent restatement of intermediate scrutiny, citing VMI as
precedent decreasing the standard of scrutiny in VMI, and failure
by the lower court to cite VMI. The way in which the lower court
puts VMI into practice is central to this analysis. It is noted if the
court explicitly interprets the test to be a restatement of the
important objectives/substantial means test (making the reference
to VMI only a restatement of traditional intermediate scrutiny).
Next, I examine the language that the court adopts from the VMI
264 VMI's Board of Visitors considered refusing federal funding to remain an all-

male institution. In a nine to eight vote, however, the Board agreed to accept
women. Widiss, supra note 212, at 268 (1998).
265 id.
The reception of VMI by lower courts impacts far more than single-sex
educational institutions. For example, women prisoners have challenged unequal
educational and vocational opportunities under Title IX without challenging the
facial classification of gender-segregation. Rosemary M. Kennedy, The
Treatment of Women PrisonersAfter the VMI Decision: Application of a New
"HeightenedScrutiny," 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 65 (1997).
26
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decision: Does it mention "exceedingly persuasive justification" or
"skeptical scrutiny"? Finally, I ask if the court views "important
governmental objectives" as a threshold and how stringently it
examines the means by which the statute or practice was
implemented. From July 1996 to May 2001, fifteen federal district
court opinions and fifteen circuit court opinions cite United States
v. Virginia as precedent in cases dealing with gender
discrimination.267
Ginsburg's opinion neither explicitly calls for strict scrutiny
(Scalia's criticism aside), nor does it expressly reiterate
intermediate scrutiny. Within he analysis, she refers to her standard
as skeptical scrutiny. Thus, VMI initiates a standard often referred
to as intermediate plus.
Strict Scrutiny
In N. Shore Concrete & Assoc. v. City of New York, 268 the
District Court of the Eastern District of New York stated that
"United States v. Virginia has called the use of intermediate
scrutiny for gender-based distinctions into question by using an
'exceedingly persuasive justification' standard., 269 While it did not
necessarily believe that the new standard was equivalent with strict
scrutiny, in its analysis the court found that New York's Minority
Business Enterprise and Women Business Enterprise programs
withstood even strict scrutiny. Similarly, the United States District
Court for. the District of Minnesota applied strict scrutiny 27in0
another affirmative action case, in In re: Sherbrooke Sodding.
However, this court found that the program was not narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest and therefore
failed the test.
267

See supra note 2 for full listing of cases.

2 94 Cv. 4017 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
9Id. at 4022.
270 17 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (Minn. 1998).
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Intermediate Scrutiny Plus
In a citizenship case, Breyer v. Meissner,27 1 a man who
assisted in persecution under the Nazi regime was denied
citizenship even though his mother was a U.S. citizen living
overseas at the time of his birth in 1925 when only males could
transfer citizenship to their children. The court rejected his claim
in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Miller v. Albrigh 272 and
the district court's recognition of an increased standard of scrutiny
in gender discrimination cases. 273 The fifth circuit came to a
similar conclusion in Tuan Ahn Nguyen v. INS.274
The Seventh Circuit, in Hill v. Ross,275 addressed the
implementation of an affirmative action plan for hiring professors
at the University of Wisconsin at Whitewater. While the
Psychology Department at the institution initially voted to offer
Paul Hill a tenure track position in clinical psychology, the
department received strong objections from Howard Ross, Dean of
the College of Letters and Sciences, who wanted the university to
hire a woman instead.276 Ross ultimately blocked Hill's
23 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D. Penn. 1998).
523 U.S. 420 (1998). Miller involved a woman whose mother was an alien
and whose father was a U.S. citizen. She was denied U.S. citizenship under the
same statute as Ahumada-Aguilar. In a plurality opinion, the Court ruled, using
rational basis scrutiny, that the statute survived the petitioner's constitutional
challenge. Without the father's affirmative participation, a gender bias claim did
not afford a litigant heightened scrutiny ordinarily applicable to such cases.
Miller v. Albright originated in the eighth circuit as Miller v. Christopher. It is
discussed in the section on cases that did not cite VMI.
273 23 F. Supp. 2d 521, 530 (E.D. Penn. 1998). The district court stated that VMI
held that "to withstand an equal protection challenge under heightened scrutiny,
where the government engages in gender-based action, it 'must show at least that
the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that
the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives'
274 208 F. 3d 528 (5th Cir. 2000).
275 183 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 1999).
276 In 1995, the Psychology Department proposed to make two appointments:
one is clinical psychology and one in social psychology. Both proposed
candidates were male. Ross reminded the Department that "the hiring goals for
the [psychology] department was 61.8 percent women." At the time, the
department needed at least three women to reach the target. Id. at 590.
271

272
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nomination, leaving the position vacant. 277 The United States
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted
summary judgment for the University, concluding that its decision
was guided by a valid affirmative action plan.
On appeal, the court of appeals found that "such a plan
neither rests on a powerful justification nor uses sex in a way that
is narrowly tailored to the justification" as is required for
affirmative action plans, and overruled the judgment of the district
court. First, it charged that Ross used Hill's gender as the sole
basis for his decision. Second, the court states that Hill acted in a
way that was inconsistent with the university's affirmative action
plan. The Psychology department was not required to submit more
than one name to the dean, and he was not bound to reject the
names if the department only submitted male names. Finally,
utilizing the language of VMI, the seventh circuit states that the
justification by the university "must be 'exceedingly
persuasive,'"278 a burden that the circuit does not feel the state met.
This appellate decision cites both VMI and utilizes key phrases like
"exceedingly persuasive justification" in the opinion. However,
the case also demonstrates that one negative result of strengthening
the standard of review in gender discrimination cases is the
weakening of affirmative action programs.
In Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson,279 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the seventh circuit notes that "even sex discrimination
against males requires the state to bear the burden of justification."
While the section of the statute favoring minority businesses does
not survive constitutional muster, the court does not attempt to
determine if a more tolerant constitutional regime is in order for
sex discrimination.
In Barnett v. Texas Wrestling Assoc., 28 0 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas said that women
who were members of a varsity wrestling team but were denied
permission to participate in mixed-gender wrestling because of
277
278
279

Id. at 588.
Id. at 590 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)).
125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997).

ms16 F. Supp. 2d 690 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
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their gender were entitled to injunctive relief and compensatory
and punitive damages. In their analysis, the district court relied on
Ginsburg's wording in VMI rather than just the traditional wording
of the test. The district court for the Eastern District of Virginia
also cited Ginsburg's language in a title IX claim in Thorpe v.
Virginia State University.
In Buzzetti v. City of New York,282 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the second circuit found that the disparate treatment in
the law between clubs featuring topless male and female dancers
did not constitute an equal protection violation. The court used the
language of VMI in its finding that the statute not only passed the
important objective/substantial means test, but also did not "rely on
an overbroad generalization about the different talents, capacities,
or preferences of males and females."
In Franks v. Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf,283 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the sixth circuit found that Congress intentionally
abrogated the immunity of the states from suit in Title IX cases. 2"
The appellate court cites VMI as the authority in finding that
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the
authority to enforce the substantive provisions of the Amendment,
28 5
including the proscription of gender discrimination in education.
281 6
282

F. Supp. 2d 507 (E.D. Va. 1998).
140 F.3d 134 (2nd Cir. 1998).

2s'

142 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 1998).

28, In this case, the plaintiffs, Holly Franks and her daughter HBL, a student at

the Kentucky School for the Deaf, allege that the State Board for Elementary and
Secondary Education of Kentucky violated Title IX because they "knowingly
failed to take action to remedy a hostile environment caused by [a] male
student's sexual harassment, thereby denying HBL the benefits of and subjecting
her to discrimination under the educational program of the school." While
incidents of harassment and were reported to officials at the school, no action
was taken, and the boy was able to later rape HBL at knife point during a school
trip. Id. at 361-2.
28 The Eleventh Amendment bars individuals from suing a state in federal court.
However, under some circumstances, Congress may rescind the states' sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. A state may also waive its immunity.
The plaintiffs in this case claim that Congress abrogated immunity and the state
waived their immunity by accepting federal funds. The Supreme Court
articulated a two-prong test in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996),
that allows states to retain their immunity unless Congress unequivocally

BUFFALO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

VOL. IX

The importance of this opinion in impact analysis is great: the
appellate court does more than mechanically apply the principle to
the case at hand, but it also utilizes it as a springboard to extend the
logic of the case.

Restatement of the "Traditional" Intermediate Scrutiny
Standard
In Crawford v. Davis,286 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
eighth circuit does not refer directly to the language of VMI, but
uses the case as an example of the Supreme Court's repeated
pronouncements that substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment proscribe gender discrimination in education. The
case dealt with a series of incidents of "quid pro quo" sexual
harassment of Michelle Crawford by one of her instructors at the
University of Central Arkansas.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the eleventh circuit, in Eng'g
27
Contractors Assoc. of S. Florida v. Metro. Dade County, 9
recognized that "the phrase 'exceedingly persuasive justification'
expresses an intent to abrogate the immunity and Congress acts in a way
pursuant to a valid exercise of power. 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996). The circuit court
maintains that, while Title IX did not originally state whether or not it applied to
state governments, the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 included explicit
language 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(l) which clearly satisfied the first requirement.
Congress acted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that grants
Congress the power to abrogate the immunity of states. Even though Congress
did not expressly invoke the authority of Section 5, Title IX proscribes gender
discrimination in education, which is allowed.
236 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir. 1997).
2" 122 F.3d 895 (11 th Cir. 1997). The case involved three affirmative action
programs enacted by the Dade County Board of Commissioners which
collectively provided minority and women owned businesses to qualify for
"participation goals" set by the county. It affirmed the district court's ruling that
the county's usage of race-, ethnicity-, and gender -conscious measure in
connection with county construction projects was unconstitutional. The county's
race- and ethnicity-conscious programs were not narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest. The gender-conscious program, though
sufficiently flexible to satisfy the substantial relationship prong of intermediate
scrutiny, was still unconstitutional because the county failed to present sufficient
probative evidence of discrimination against women in the relevant parts of the
local construction industry.
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permeates the Court's VMI opinion .. . and that phrase connotes
more intense scrutiny than do customary descriptions of
intermediate scrutiny. ' , 288 However, it also found that the district
court correctly applied intermediate scrutiny to the program
because it does not read the phrase as creating a new constitutional
standard for judging gender preferences. Furthermore, it states that
"a holding that the Supreme Court has abandoned traditional
intermediate scrutiny in favor of a more restrictive formulation
would mean that the Court has overruled sub silentio its long line
of precedents applying intermediate scrutiny to gender
classifications ' '289 which suggests that intermediate scrutiny is still
the appropriate test to apply. In another affirmative action case, the
ninth circuit upheld California's Proposition 209 quoting
Ginsburg's opinion in VMI "without equating gender
classifications, for all purposes, to classifications based on race or
national origin, the Court ... has carefully inspected official action
29
that closes a door or denies opportunity to women (or to men). 0
The District Court of Colorado followed the lead of the Eleventh
Circuit's interpretation of VMI in affirmative action cases
declaring that the Supreme Court needed to give more clarification
about the standard.29
In enjoining Dade County, Florida from using racial, ethnic,
or gender criteria in deciding whether a bid submitted for
construction work will be awarded in Engineering Contractors
Assoc. of S. Florida v. Metro. Dade County,292 the District Court
for the Southern District of Florida applied intermediate scrutiny.
The court said that it was unnecessary to consider the higher form
of scrutiny if the program failed at the lower level. Thus, this court
also avoided having to pinpoint what the Supreme Court meant by
"skeptical scrutiny" because it was "unnecessary to decide whether
the VMI decision required the County to meet an even more
288

Id. at 907.

289

Id. at 908.
Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1997)

290

(quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 526 (1996)).
29 Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 86 F. Supp.
2d 1042 (D. Colo. 2000).
292 943 F. Supp. 1546 (S.D. Fla. 1996).

156

BUFFALO WOMEN'S LAw JOURNAL

VOL. IX

difficult burden of proof. '293 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of New York,294 for New Jersey,295 and
Maryland 296 avoided having to determine the level of scrutiny that
should be applied in affirmative action cases by determining that
the programs would have failed at the lower level regardless.
United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar,297 involved 8 U.S.C.
Sec. 1409 (a)(3) and (4) which state that a child born "out of
wedlock" whose father is a United States citizen and whose mother
is an alien must show that the putative father has agreed to provide
financial support to the child, and has acknowledged paternity or
that paternity has been legally declared for the child. However,
there is no such requirement for a child who is born to a U.S.
mother and alien father. 298 Ricardo Ahumada-Aguilar appealed his
conviction on two counts of illegal reentry by an alien with prior
felony convictions on the grounds that the law violates the equal
protection rights of males as the law requires men to overcome
more obstacles than females when passing U.S. citizenship to their
children.299
While the Appellate Court for the ninth circuit relied on
Miller as the controlling case, the court acknowledges, as the
Supreme Court did in Miller, that the applicable standard of review
in gender discrimination cases is outlined in United States v.
Virginia: "A statute that discriminates on the basis of gender
typically is subjected to heightened scrutiny. ' '3° Conversely, in
'9Id. at 1556.
294

Sheriff's Silver Star Assoc. of Oswego County v. County of Oswego, 56 F.

Supp. 2d 263 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
295 Assoc. for Fairness in Bus., Inc. v. New Jersey, 82 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D. N.J.

2000).
Assoc. Util. Contrs. of Md., Inc. v.Mayor of Baltimore, 83 F.Supp. 2d 613
(D. Md. 2000)
297 189 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1999).
29 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
296

299 Ahumada-Aguilar admitted at a 1991 deportation hearing that he had been
convicted of possession of cocaine and the immigration judge ordered that he be
deported. He returned to the United States without the prior approval of the
Attorney General and was deported again in 1994. He was indicted on two
counts of illegally entering the United States after deportation as a convicted
felon in 1995. United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d at 1123.
'0o Id. at 1125.
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Terrell v. INS,3 ' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the tenth circuit
relied on VMI and Miller to stay Kerry Suthridge Terrell's
deportation because her father was not a party to the action and,
therefore, her gender bias claim did not afford her the heightened
scrutiny ordinarily applicable in citizenship claims.
In Cohen v. Brown Univ.,30 2 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the first circuit found that the university violated Title IX of the
Education Amendments by not making a good faith effort to
equally fund men's and women's sports. However, in its analysis,
the court explicitly emphasizes that it believes VMI did not change
caselaw. 30 3 The first circuit found that the shift in emphasis from
the phrase "substantially related to an important governmental
objective" to "exceedingly persuasive justification" meant little
because it felt the high court
still utilized intermediate scrutiny and
3 4
0
variation.
not a stronger
In Nabozny v. Podlesny,30 5 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the seventh circuit only mentioned VMI in a footnote and was
careful to add that they "express no opinion on whether the Court's
ruling heightens the level of scrutiny applied to gender
discrimination in [their] circuit. "3° 6 Likewise, the court relied on
the common understanding of intermediate scrutiny in the case.
The District Court for the Northern District of California
granted an injunction against the implementation of California
Proposition 209 partially because of its language regarding gender
in Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson.30 7 While careful to note
that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of gender
301 157

F.3d 806 (10th Cir. 1998).

302 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996). This case was a class action lawsuit against

Brown University charging the school with discrimination against women in the
operation of its intercollegiate athletics program. The petitioners charged that the
university disproportionately funded men's sports over women's sports even
though the enrollment distribution between the sexes was nearly equal.
303 Id. at n. 22. "We point out that Virginia adds nothing to the analysis of equal
protection challenges to gender-based classifications that has not been part of the
analysis since 1979."'
3
0 1id.

305 92 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1996).
3

IJd. atn. 6.

307 946 F. Supp. 1480

(N.D.CA 1996).
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discrimination is somewhat unsettled since VMI, the court does
specify that "gender and racial classifications do not receive
identical treatment under the Equal Protection Clause.... Gender
classifications are subject to less stringent intermediate scrutiny
review."30 8 Though the court seemed to reaffirm intermediate
scrutiny in its decision, it managed to avoid having to decide the
exact standard to use in gender discrimination cases by finding that
the proposition fails to survive even intermediate scrutiny which
made it unnecessary to apply the more stringent strict scrutiny
test. 309 The court of appeals, using intermediate scrutiny, vacated
the injunction because it felt that the plaintiffs would not31succeed
0
on the merits of the equal protection or preemption claims.
In 2000, the Eastern and Western Districts of Virginia
addressed cases involving disparities in the grooming standards for
male and female prisoners. 3 1 While both courts note the use of
"exceedingly persuasive justification" language, they do not
suggest that this makes the scrutiny any stronger than it was
previously. In both cases the courts dismiss the challengers'
objection to the policy.
In enjoining Dade County, Florida from using racial, ethnic,
or gender criteria in deciding whether a bid submitted for
construction work will be awarded in Eng'ng ContractorsAssoc.
of S. Florida v. Metro. Dade County,312 the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida applied intermediate scrutiny. The
court said that it was unnecessary to consider the higher form of
scrutiny if the program failed at the lower level. Thus, this court
also avoided having to pinpoint what the Supreme Court meant by
"skeptical scrutiny" because it was "unnecessary to decide whether
the VMI decision required the County to meet an even more
difficult burden of proof. 31 3 The United States District Court for
30Jld. at 1501.
0 Id. at 1508.

30 Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
311 Deblasio v. Johnson, 128 F.Supp. 2d 315 (E.D.Va. 2000); Ashann-Ra v.
Virginia, 112 F.Supp. 2d 559 (W.D.Va. 2000).

332 943 F.Supp. 1546 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
313 Id. at 1556
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the Northern District of New York cited VMI as a restatement of
the important interest/substantially related means test in holding
that the state violated the Equal Protection Clause by limiting the
job opportunities of female corrections officers in the 1999 case
Sheriff's 14
Silver Star Assoc. of Oswego County v. County of
3
Oswego.

In Zoch v. City of Chicago,315 the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois cites VMI as well as Craig v. Boren
and states that gender discrimination is a "quasi-suspect" class.
Likewise, in Richmond Med. Center v. Gilmore,3 16 the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia mentioned VMI only in
passing and reiterated the traditional intermediate scrutiny
standard.
In Jefferson v. City of Harvey,31 7 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that the female
citizens of a particular city did not constitute a protected class, but
that woman in general are a protected class. In reference to VMI,
the court did state that "there is some disagreement over how far
the protection [of women as a class] extends," 31 8 suggesting that
this court, too, was unsure of the extent that VMI changed the
standard.
314 56 F. Supp. 2d 263 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
31s 94 C. 4788 (N.D. Iil. 1997).

55 F. Supp. 2d 441 (E.D. Va. 1999).
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20158 (N.D. III. 1999). In this case, Raymond Eaves,
brother of a Harvey police department officer, strangled, raped and otherwise
threatened and terrorized women of the town of Harvey and bragged that he
could continue to do so without fear of arrest because of his relationship with his
brother. In fact, multiple times women who had been attacked identified
Raymond Eaves as their assailant, but no police action was ever taken against
him. Plaintiffs sued the town of Harvey when, in the course of the trial against
Raymond for the rape and murder Denise Shelby, it was learned that the police
department had intentionally refused to investigate Raymond after earlier
attacks.
316

317

318

id.
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Decreasing Standard of Scrutiny
In Keevan v. Smith,319 women inmates brought action
against prison officials charging that they denied them equal access
to post-secondary educational programs and to prison industry
employment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the eighth circuit
affirmed the decisions of the Western District of Missouri which
held that the availability of post-secondary educational courses
hinged on fiscal decisions made by the academic providers and on
a lack of demand by female inmates rather than discriminatory
action taken by the Missouri Department of Corrections and
Human Resources. The court, however, relied on VMI only to the
extent that it specifically limited state action on the basis of facially
gender-based classifications. 320 Therefore, the court interpreted the
focus of gender discrimination jurisprudence to be on facially
discriminatory means rather than the end.
Opinions In Gender Discrimination Cases Failing to Cite VMI
In analyzing the impact of VMI on lower federal courts, it
is important to call attention to cases in which the courts decided
gender discrimination cases without mentioning VMI.
The
invocation of VMI requires the involvement of some level of the
federal, state, or local government through the execution of an
officially adopted policy that causes injury and a causal connection
between the policy and the deprivation of the constitutional right to
Equal Protection. Therefore, one cannot merely search for equal
protection discrimination cases involving gender because cases
which exclusively involve private parties without any form of
32
governmental action will not be subjected to equal protection. 1
Furthermore, while one can argue that the relationship between
sexual orientation, gender identification, social norms and so on
39 100 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 1996).

320 Id. at 655.
The Supreme Court did decide in McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781

321

(1997), that a single act by a municipal official is sufficient to establish
municipal liability if that individual possessed "final policy-making authority
with respect to the case in which the action was taken," Id. at 785.
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are a crucial aspect of "gender discrimination," the law is not
necessarily as sensitive to this relationship, and the focus of
litigation is not always clearly on the gender and sex issues in
cases. 322 The following cases are but a sample of those cases that
ignore VMI and, likewise, shrink the scope of the decision.
Miller v. Christopher,323 involved 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (a)(3)
and (4) which applies to persons born out of wedlock outside of the
324
United Siates to an American father and an alien mother.
Lorelyn Penero Miller's application for citizenship was denied for
failing the requirements of the act. Without citing VMI, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. circuit rejected Miller's challenges
to the law. The circuit court did find, however, that the district
court erred in holding that Miller lacked standing 3to bring her
claim and remanded the case back to the district court. 25
In a Title IX case, Klinger v. Dep't of Corrections,326 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the eighth circuit found that the
Nebraska Department of Correctional Services and several DCS
officials did not violate the rights of the women prisoners
322

For example, in Farmer v. Hawk-Sawyer, 69 F.Supp. 2d 120 (D.C. Cir.

1999), Dee Deidre Farmer, a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual suffering
from the medically recognized psychological disorder gender dysphoria who was
an inmate in a federal correction facility, brought action to challenge the
constitutionality of the Bureau of Prison's (BOP) policy regarding the medical
treatment of transsexuals. The BOP did not provide Farmer with hormone
therapy as treatment for her gender identity disorder even though she had been
undergoing the treatment for several years before her incarceration. There is no
explicit se) And/or gender Equal Protection claim in this case. Rather, Farmer
charged that the government denied her Equal Protection because the prison
administered appropriate medications to other inmates suffering from a variety
of other mental illnesses including schizophrenia and depression.
" 96 F.3d 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
32 Not long after her twenty-first birthday, Lorelyn Penro Miller applied for
registration as a United States citizen. While her birth certificate does not name
a father, she claims to be the daughter of Charlie R. Miller, a U.S. citizen who, at
the time of her birth, was a member of the U.S. military stationed at the
Philippines.
325 When Madeline Albright assumed the position of Secretary of State, the case
became Miller v. Albright. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
Miller prevailed. This is the best example in this study of the Supreme Court
clarifying a precedent misinterpreted by lower courts.
326 107 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 1997).
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incarcerated at the Nebraska Center for Women by failing to
provide equal educational opportunities for male and female
Nebraska prisoners. The court rejected the claim stating that the
differences between male and female populations within a state's
correction system, such as unequal population sizes and length of
stay, must be taken into consideration. Instead of relying on VMI
as the controlling case, the court modeled its opinion after Jeldness
v. Pearce,3 27 in which the ninth circuit considered the differences
between circumstances of female and male prison populations in
the Oregon prison system and held that "although the programs
need not be identical in number or content, women must have
reasonable opportunities for similar studies and must have an equal
2
opportunity to participate in programs of comparable quality.A
The Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit found in Neal v.
Bd. of Trustees of the California State Univ.329 that Title IX does
not prevent a university in which male students occupy a
disproportionately higher percentage of the athletic roster spots
from making gender-conscious decisions to decrease the
proportion of roster spots assigned to men as a remedial solution.
In an employment discrimination suit, Coleman v. B-G
Maint. Mgmt. of Colorado,330 the Court of Appeals for the tenth
circuit reversed a jury award based on findings of gender-plusmarriage discrimination stating that Coleman only proved that the
company discriminated against her because of gender, not that it
discriminated on the basis of gender-plus-marriage.
Twin brothers, J. and H. Doe, were sexually harassed at
their city jobs because of their perceived sexual orientation by their
coworkers. They filed suit against the city and, in retaliation, were
fired. In Doe v. City of Belleville,33' the Court of Appeals for the
seventh circuit held that sexual harassment of men by other men is
actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
For the most part, the lower courts seem to be in agreement
that the Supreme Court's emphasis on "exceedingly persuasive
30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1994).
28 Id. at 1228-9.
329 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999).
'27

3 108 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 1997).
3 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
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justification" strengthens the intermediate scrutiny standard and
that the Court's condemnation of codified gender-based stereotypes
is not merely a loose guideline. Eight district and appellate court
decisions suggested the use of some form of intermediate plus,
generally relying on the Court's stress of the phrase "exceedingly
persuasive justification." Whi.le this may seem to comprise a large
percentage of all of the cases in this study, the lower courts tended
to word their opinions in a way that suggests that they would have
reached the same conclusion had they used traditional intermediate
scrutiny. Up to this point, then, the lower courts have given little
shape to the amorphous phrase "skeptical scrutiny" and it appears
unlikely they will in the future without more direction from the
Supreme Court. The two cases that utilized strict scrutiny did so in
conjunction with race cases in affirmative action law suits. They
did not suggest that all gender discrimination cases should utilize
strict scrutiny, but do so because they seem to be at a loss for the
"correct" standard to use in these cases.
In fourteen cases, the lower federal courts cited VMI but
suggested that the case restated the standard in Craig v. Boren.
Some of these opinions, like Zoch v. City of Chicago332 and
Richmond Med. Ctr. v. Gilmore,333 just mentioned VMI in passing
suggesting that it was just the most recent restatement of the
intermediate scrutiny test. Other cases, like Eng'g Contractors
Assoc. of S. Florida v. Metro. Dade County,334 avoided pinpointing
an exact definition of "skeptical scrutiny" stating that it was
unnecessary to decide whether VMI initiated a higher burden of
proof.
While the lower courts were very likely to refer to the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" language and several
suggested that the important interest/substantially related means
test from Craig v. Boren should be viewed as a threshold rather
than the final test, the courts were reluctant to call the test
"skeptical scrutiny." Perhaps this is not surprising since the Court
has used the first phrase before and this case only gives them new
332 94

C. 4788 (N.D. III. 1997).

333 55 F. Supp.2d 441 (E.D.Va. 1999).
33 943 F. Supp. 1546 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
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Skeptical scrutiny, however, is Ginsburg's own
invention. Only two cases, Breyer v. Meissner335 from the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and Buzzetti v. City of New York336 from
the Court of Appeals for the second circuit, refer to "skeptical
scrutiny."
The class of women least affected -- or, perhaps, most
adversely affected -- by VMI, have been women in prisons. In
Keevan v. Smith337 and Klinger v. Dep't of Corrections, the court
of appeals for the eighth circuit suggests that VMI is limited to
women at large in society. Without specifying the exact standard
to be used, the appellate court's distinction places a clear limitation
on VMI. Should other courts follow the example of the eighth
circuit, the courts could severely curb the extent to which
incarcerated women are protected from discrimination.
CONCLUSION

While it is difficult to quantify the impact that Ginsburg's
background had on the development of her feminism and judicial
339
role orientation, it is clear that it did have an impact.
Consequently, Ginsburg's background would seem to explain, at
least in part, her development as a feminist. Because many of her
brushes with discrimination came in the form of norms that
distinguished indiscriminately on the basis of sex, it is not entirely
a surprise that Ginsburg seems to fit the profile of an egalitarian
feminist. Her background also seems to be the source of her
caution as a litigator and her restraint in gender discrimination
cases as a jurist: she does not want to witness the evaporation of
hard won victories.
33' 23 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D. Penn. 1998).

140 F.3d 134 (2nd Cir. 1998).
331 100 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 1996).
338 107 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 1997).
339 Unfortunately, because in-depth information on Ginsburg is not readily
available, analysis in this paper, as elsewhere, was limited to anecdotes about
employment discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, and humiliation at law
school. It is possible that these instances are taken out of context or that they
were individually given too much emphasis.
336
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Ginsburg's efforts as a litigator to obliterate gender lines
within the law and her support for the ERA exemplify her
identification with egalitarian feminism. She recognized that,
though women constitute a numerical majority, their power is
diluted because they are separated by socio-economic class. 340 As a
litigator she felt that the most effective way for women to combat
this watered down power was through the courts. By hand-picking
the cases that she pursued with the Women's Rights Project, she
was able to choose cases that she thought could be won. However,
the most successful of these cases involved male plaintiffs or men
as victims of a system that favored women through benign
classifications.34 ' Thus, "equality" became a synonym for
assimilation.
While the assimilationist method succeeded in bringing
women within the purview of the Constitution, it also may have
managed, as David Cole suggests, to limit protection based on
gender discrimination. 342 The premise of the egalitarian argument
rests on the assumption that equality means that women are like
men and, therefore, should be treated the same without seriously
accounting for the different biological traits of the sexes. While
Ginsburg won cases like Reed v. Reed 343 in which she emphasized
factors in modern society which allowed women to conceivably
carve out a place beyond the home, as a whole her case sequence
relied heavily on male plaintiffs who challenged statutes that
discriminated against them because of the way they sought to
"protect" women. The same Court which granted gender
discrimination heightened scrutiny stature, also upheld mandatory
unpaid maternity leaves 344 and denied certiorari to a court of
340 id.
341 See e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Kahn v. Shevin,
416
U.S. 351 (1974); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
342 Cole, supra note 125, at 33.
343 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
344 Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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appeals case which upheld a statute
denying women the right to
345
marriage.
after
surname
their
retain
Ginsburg's prior legal experience seems to have had the
greatest impact on her judicial role orientation and judicial
philosophy. As a lawyer for the Women's Rights Project, she
sought to change the law slowly, and as a jurist she reiterated that
position insisting again and again that judges recognize their
3
interdependence with the other branches of the government. 46
However, she does eschew the activist versus restraint model in
favor of the individualist versus institutionally-minded dichotomy,
suggesting that collegiality among justices with some room for
dissent is best for the judiciary.
Ginsburg's voting record on the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals reveals that she has moderate to conservative leanings
as a jurist. As a Supreme Court justice, she has become slightly
more moderate. Still, her statements suggest restraint. She has said
that judges should limit their decisions and not decide things
beyond the case at hand. She believes that precedent, not a jurist's
opinion, should be the guiding factor in deciding cases. She also
supports an Equal Rights Amendment to guide judges in gender
equal protection cases. In addition, she believes that the
Constitution is an evolving document, and hints, particularly in
gender discrimination cases, that judicial standards are not set in
stone.
Though it seems that Ginsburg did seek to expand the
understanding of what is included under the purview of gender
discrimination, VMI seems to have yielded more confusion than
clarity for the lower courts. While none of the opinions suggest that
VMI heightened the standard of scrutiny to strict, several found a
way to employ strict scrutiny and suggested that if the law could
pass the highest form of scrutiny, it would pass "skeptical"
scrutiny. Cases involving female prisoners seemed to be the only
Whitlow v. Hodges, 538 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
1029 (1976).
346 Ginsburg has made this argument in several articles including Speaking in a
Judicial Voice, supra note 131; Styles of Collegial Judging, supra note 150; and
Remarks On Writing Separately, supra note 156; as well as in her statements
during her Supreme Court confirmation hearing.
34
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ones that received rational or rational plus scrutiny as the courts
deferred to the popularly elected branches. A surprising number of
cases failed to cite VMI altogether.
For now, it seems that Chief Justice Rehnquist's criticism
that the verbiage employed by the majority's opinion muddied the
waters of gender discrimination jurisprudence rather than purified
them rings true. Along with failing to be a stepping stone toward
strict scrutiny, VMI seems to have fulfilled little of the promise
suggested soon after the Court announced the decision. Rather
than exploring the words that Ginsburg chooses to stress, district
and appellate courts cling to the more firmly established standards
of earlier cases. For now it seems that, at most, the legacy of VMI
level, by providing leverage
will endure only at the Supreme Court
347
for future Equal Protection claims.
347 Yet, even at the Supreme Court level, gender discrimination law still lurks in

murky waters. Just prior to the publication of this article, the Supreme Court
handed down a decision affirming the the fifth circuit's review of Tuan Anh
Nguyen v. INS, - U.S. __, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 150 L. Ed. 2d 115 (2001). While
Justice Kennedy's opinion does cite VMI as the authority for gender
discrimination cases, he does not utilize Ginsburg's language. Instead, he relies
on the previous test stating "a gender-based classification withstands equal
protection scrutiny if it serves important governmental objectives and the
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives," 121 S. Ct. at 2059. In a passionate dissent, Justice O'Connor
(joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter) critisized the majority's
interpretation of VMI arguing that it accepted as justification for the discrepancy
stereotypes, thinly disguised as important objectives.

